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Abstract 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to test the unbiased forward rate hypothesis in emerging economies and 
the impact of time horizon. The unbiased forward rate hypothesis tests whether a forward rate is an 
unbiased predictor of future exchange rate. The implications of findings on hedging foreign 
exchange risk are intended to be analyzed.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The data consists of monthly observations of exchange rates and forward premiums for the 
maturities of 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months for ten emerging economies: Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey. The exchange rate data is 
retrieved from Bloomberg terminal and all the quotes are against US dollar. For the aforementioned 
maturities, the unbiased forward rate hypothesis is tested with the Fama regression model using 
Newey-West standard errors. The time horizon effect for maturities of one and five years is 
examined by a graphical depiction of the forward prediction error in exchange rate terms. The five 
year forward premium is approximated by a sum of five consequent one year forward premiums.  
 
FINDINGS 
On one month interval, the unbiased forward hypothesis is rejected in the emerging economies. 
Extending the time horizon to one year, the regression model produces increasingly biased estimates 
of future exchange rate. The graphical depiction of forward forecast error confirms the findings from 
the regression model. When comparing the one year bias to five year bias, measured in exchange 
rate terms, the bias is found to increase along with the extended time horizon. In the majority of the 
sample countries, on the five year maturity the forward prediction error becomes consistently 
positive implying that the five year forward rate is a systematically upwards biased predictor of 
future exchange rate. The impact on hedging performance depends on which currency the entity in 
question is selling and which currency it is buying with the forward contract. Hedging an emerging 
market currency denominated foreign exchange risk on a five year horizon has either been 
systematically profitable or unprofitable throughout the sample. 
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tutkielman tavoitteena on tutkia harhattoman termiinikurssin hypoteesia kehittyvien talouksien 
valuutoissa ja aikahorisontin vaikutusta. Tarkoituksena on siis mitata ennustaako 
valuuttatermiinikurssi harhaisesti vai harhattomasti tulevaisuudessa toteutuvaa valuuttakurssia. 
Lisäksi tutkielman tavoitteena on analysoida, mikä on tulosten vaikutus valuuttariskien hallintaan 
kehittyvien talouksien valuutoissa.  
 
AINEISTO JA MENETELMÄT 
Aineisto on muodostettu kuukausittaisista havainnoista valuuttakursseja ja termiinipisteitä 1-, 3-, 6- 
ja 12-kuukauden maturiteeteille. Aineistossa on kymmenen kehittyvää valtiota: Brasilia, Chile, 
Indonesia, Intia, Etelä-Afrikka, Etelä-Korea, Mexico, Tšekin tasavalta, Turkki ja Venäjä. Valuutta-
aineisto on ladattu Bloombergin tietokannasta ja aineiston kaikki valuuttakurssit sekä termiinipisteet 
ovat noteerattuja Yhdysvaltain dollaria vastaan. Harhattoman termiinikurssin hypoteesia testataan 
ensin lyhyellä aikavälillä käyttäen Fama-regressiomallia, jossa hyödynnetään Newey-West 
keskivirhettä. Pidemmän aikahorisontin vaikutusta kokeillaan yhden ja viiden vuoden ajanjaksoilla 
esittämällä graafisesti valuuttakurssimääräinen ennustevirhe. Viiden vuoden termiini on synteettinen 
tai keinotekoinen tarkoittaen sitä, että se on estimoitu laskemalla yhteen viisi peräkkäistä yhden 
vuoden termiinipreemiota.   
 
TULOKSET 
Yhden kuukauden aikavälillä harhattoman termiinikurssin hypoteesi hylätään. Aikahorisontin 
kasvattaminen vuoden mittaiseksi aiheuttaa hypoteesin merkittävämmän hylkäämisen, koska 
regressiomallin mittaama harhaisuus kasvaa systemaattisesti ajanjakson kasvattamisen johdosta.  
Graafinen ennustevirheen tarkastelu yhden ja viiden vuoden välillä vahvistaa regressiomallissa 
todennetun dynamiikan: aikahorisontin kasvaessa termiinin harhaisuus kasvaa. Merkittävää viiden 
vuoden ennustevirheessä on se, että se on systemaattisesti positiivinen suurimmassa osassa aineiston 
valuutoista. Positiivinen ennustevirhe tarkoittaa, että viiden vuoden termiini ennustaa tulevaa 
valuuttakurssia systemaattisesti harhaisesti yläkanttiin eli ennuste on suurempi kuin toteuma. 
Vaikutus valuuttariskien suojaamiseen riippuu siitä, kumpaa valuuttaa (kehittyvän valtion valuuttaa 
vai dollaria) entiteetti ostaa ja kumpaa se myy termiinisopimuksella. Valuuttariskin suojaaminen 
viiden vuoden aikahorisontilla on ollut siten joko järjestelmällisesti tuottoisaa tai tappiollista.  
 
Avainsanat Kattamaton korkopariteetti, harhaton termiinikurssi, aikahorisontti efekti, kehittyvät 
taloudet, valuuttakurssit, suojaaminen, valuuttatermiini, OTC johdannaismarkkinat 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to the topic 
 
“Locking in an exchange rate through a forward contract – the most common way to hedge 
currency risk – is rarely economic with high-yielding EM currencies”  
- The Financial Times1  
 
Multinational companies (MNCs) operate increasingly in the emerging economies, striving to get 
their share of the rapid growth and profit potential. Only from 2006 to 2013 the foreign direct 
investment into emerging economies has increased from USD 400 billion to USD 780 billion2. There 
are many risks in entering the developing economies and one of them is the foreign exchange (FX) 
risk, which is completely different from what multinational companies are used to in their standard 
risk management practices. The predominant approach of MNCs to managing foreign exchange risk 
is the Over-The-Counter (OTC) foreign exchange market where different instruments, such as 
forward contracts and options, are available for hedging and other purposes. The OTC FX volume of 
non-financial customers, which includes MCNs and governments, has increased from a daily average 
of USD 265 billion in 1998 to a daily average of USD 465 billion in 20133. Despite the OTC market 
becoming the prevailing avenue of foreign exchange trade for both non-financial and financial 
counterparties, the emerging market currencies (EM currencies) are still in their infancy in terms of 
e.g. market liquidity, institutional interventions as well as exchange rate (spot rate) and capital 
controls4. In addition to the market imperfections that may distort the prices in the foreign exchange 
market, the emerging market currencies are frequently associated with certain mathematical 
abnormalities.   
 
Technically speaking one of the foremost challenges with managing, i.e. hedging, a risk in these 
currencies is that the OTC forward premiums for the emerging market currencies are extraordinarily 
large. The forward premium, which equals the difference between an exchange rate now and a 
forward rate agreed to a future date, has a very intuitive explanation: It is approximately equal to the 
                                                 
1 FT.com. Darren Smith, HSBC head of corporate FX sales. The Financial Times, May 26, 2014.  
2 World investment report 2014, by United Nations.  
3 Triennial central bank survey of foreign exchange and derivatives market activity in 2013. Issued by Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS).  
4 Nordea emerging markets fact book 2013.  
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difference between the interest rates in two countries for the specified maturity. The problem is that 
for countries classified as emerging, or developing, the interest rates are high in comparison with 
advanced or developed economies; e.g. in 2010 the average US dollar 12-month deposit rate was 
0.9% whereas the average 12-month risk-free Brazilian real rate was approximately 9.5%5. For 
Brazilian real, this a historically low rate; in 2003 it was on average 16%. This discrepancy is called 
the interest rate differential and it equals the forward premium. When the maturity of the forward is 
extended from the specified one year, the premium may grow to an even more significant scale. 
 
Another technical challenge in hedging with emerging market currencies is that the exchange rates 
are presumed to have been on a continuously declining trend. If the exchange rate is experiencing an 
ongoing decline, the forward rate agreed to now will be larger than the exchange rate that materializes 
in the future, unless, the forward premium is negative. As illustrated, the forward premium in the case 
of Brazilian real is nowhere near negative, on the contrary, it is positive and substantial. With these 
two combined, a foreign exchange risk manager is puzzled. If a forward contract is entered under a 
trend of exchange rate decline and the forward premium is substantial, the forward rate will be 
considerably higher than the exchange rate that materializes in the future. The practical implication 
is that the difference between a forward rate and a future exchange rate is the definition of profit or 
cost of a forward contract or hedge. Furthermore, when the maturity is extended to multiple years, 
logically, the forward premium escalates even further. This leads to the question that exactly how 
biased predictor of future exchange rate the forward rate is? 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the discussed presumed challenges in hedging a foreign exchange risk in emerging 
market currencies using OTC forward contracts. In the figure, the historical US dollar against 
Brazilian real exchange rate is depicted and, in addition, hypothetical forward rates for different 
maturities, namely from one to five years. Especially for the first set of forward rates, when the 
maturity is extended from one to five years, the discrepancy between the forward rate and the future 
exchange rate increases substantially (see the vertical dashed lines). Depending on the size of the 
forward premium for different maturities and the extent of the exchange rate decline, the forward rate 
may be highly upwards biased predictor of future exchange rate, especially at a time horizon of 
multiple years. If such dynamics were to be found, the implication would be consistent profitability 
or costliness depending upon the entity in question.   
                                                 
5 Computed from the data set. The 2010 interest rate differential is not abnormally considerable even though the US dollar 
rate appears historically low. On average for the full sample the interest rate differential is far greater. 
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Figure 1: Illustrating the research topic: USD/BRL rate and hypothetical forward rates 
Figure 1 shows the actual historical USD/BRL (US dollar, Brazilian real) exchange rate during 1999-2014. In addition 
there are two theoretical forward rate lines starting in 2005 and 2008 respectively. They illustrate the difference between 
committing to one, two… or five year forward rate: marked as (𝑓𝑡
1,2…5), where the superscript denotes the maturity in 
years. The dashed lines are the differences to current spot exchange market, i.e. the forward rate prediction error or yield. 
The point is to show that the substantial forward premiums in conjunction with the trend of appreciating emerging market 
currency may result in highly costly commitments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The controversy concerning the relationship between the forward rate and the future exchange rate is 
not entirely a novel idea as such. As a matter of fact, it is perhaps the most studied theory in the field 
of international finance, known as the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) or the unbiased forward 
rate hypothesis6 (for a review see e.g. Engel, 1996; Froot and Thaler, 1990). The reasons for its 
popularity as a research topic are its importance for the participants in the foreign exchange market, 
theory’s intuitively appealing relationship and, lastly, the invariable finding that the uncovered 
interest rate parity fails. The OTC FX market is simply massive; in 2013 it reached a daily volume of 
5.3 trillion US dollar7, out of which the proportion of currency forwards and swap derivatives is 
substantial. Given the market is highly liquid, intuitively the forward rates could be assumed to have 
                                                 
6 Unbiased forward rate hypothesis is analogous to uncovered interest rate parity if the covered interest rate parity is 
assumed to hold (Engel, 1996). The literature convention is to use these terms interchangeably which is done in this thesis 
as well.   
7 Reuters.com. Published Sep 5, 2013.  
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some meaningful relationship to the future exchange rates. However, regardless of countless of 
attempts, there have been surprisingly few studies finding that a forward rate would be to any degree 
predictive of future exchange rate (Engel, 1996; Rossi, 2013). Moreover, the abundant articles have 
not even reached a consensus as to why the uncovered interest rate parity systematically fails, hence 
the term forward premium anomaly (Engel, 1996).  
 
A promising branch of literature has examined the impact of extending the time horizon from the 
traditional one month to even decades. Lothian and Wu (2011) and Snaith, Coakley and Kellard 
(2013) find that in the advanced economies, the uncovered interest rate parity holds well at distant 
horizons i.e. that the forward rate becomes an unbiased or accurate predictor of future exchange rate. 
Snaith, Coakley and Kellard (2013) argue that the UIP holds already at a three year interval and, 
furthermore, they find a continuous tendency of the forward rates to become more and more unbiased 
as the time horizon is extended step by step. Given that in addition Chinn (2006) finds concurring 
evidence, it can be concluded that the current consensus is that the UIP holds better for longer time 
periods in the advanced economies.   
 
Emerging market currencies introduce a new, curious, twist to the uncovered interest rate parity. First 
of all, the interest rate differentials are as if from a different planet. As mentioned, the difference 
between the risk-free interest rates of US dollar and Brazilian real was at 9%, under a low interest 
rate environment. Under similar circumstances, the interest rate differential between the US dollar 
and euro was approximately 0.35%8. Moreover, according to Lothian and Wu’s (2011) data set 
description, the interest rate differential has been relatively low between advanced economies also 
historically. Secondly, the emerging market currencies are mostly less liquid than the major 
currencies and the foreign exchange markets are frequently imperfect (Doukas and Zhang, 2013). The 
final characteristic making the emerging markets a unique test environment is the well-known 
investment strategy called carry trade. The renowned profitability of carry trade is indicative of a 
violation of the uncovered interest parity but it is not a direct test of the UIP as such (Menkhoff, 
Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf, 2012). Nevertheless, one could expect the forward premium 
anomaly to be exceptionally severe in the emerging economies given the shown profitability of carry 
trade. The studies of the parity theory in emerging economies are extremely scarce. In one of the few 
existing studies Frankel and Poonwala (2010) find, to all surprise, that the interest rate differentials 
are less biased predictors of future exchange rates in emerging economies in comparison to advanced 
                                                 
8 12-month average EURIBOR in 2010 was at 1.251% 
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economies. Therefore Frankel and Poonwala (2010) propose that the parity holds better in emerging 
economies.  
1.2 The research question and contribution 
This study examines the unbiased forward rate hypothesis and time horizon effect in emerging 
economies using OTC forward rates. The UIP and its relationship to time horizon has been examined 
in advanced economies by e.g. Snaith, Coakley and Kellard (2013) and Lothian and Wu (2011), but 
for emerging market currencies the time horizon effect has not been studied to best of my knowledge. 
However, with the regular short, one month, interval, the UIP has been already tested in the emerging 
economies by Frankel and Poonwala (2010). My study differs from the paper by Frankel and 
Poonwala (2010) not only by investigating both short and long maturities but in addition by having 
six years of more data. Moreover, this study differentiates from all of the aforementioned by using 
the actual OTC forward quotes instead of interest rates. In addition, this study intends to address more 
accurately the nature of the UIP failure: Will the forward rate become increasingly one-sidedly biased 
given the emerging market presumed tendencies as illustrated in figure 1?  
 
I examine the unbiased forward rate hypothesis in two distinct phases. First, for short maturity data 
of 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months, the literature standard test Fama regression is run. The Fama regression 
consist of two logarithmic variables, the change in exchange rate and the forward premium. Thus, the 
regression intends to explain the variation in exchange rate with the variation in forward premium. 
The regression is run for all maturities using monthly data which creates a data overlap problem. To 
address this issue, Newey-West standard errors are employed. However, according to Snaith, Coakley 
and Kellard (2013), the Newey-West standard errors are only a part of the answer to the data overlap 
issue. Because the overlap is expected to become excessively pronounced, for the maturities above 
12-months the unbiased forward rate hypothesis is tested with an alternative method. Another reason 
for the change of methodology is that both in the previous academic literature and in this paper it is 
found that the Fama regression model has serious downfalls. The forward premium is known to 
exhibit a highly steady behaviour whereas the exchange rate is extremely volatile. In addition, 
potential time series breaks affect the regression specification.  
 
In the second phase of the research, the unbiased forward rate hypothesis is tested for one and five 
year horizons by graphically plotting the forward rate bias or prediction error that is measured in 
exchange rate terms. The forward rate prediction error equals the difference between the forward rate 
and the exchange rate that the forward rate intended to predict (the dashed line in figure 1). It is 
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deduced from the Fama regression variables and hence it is a comparable test of unbiased forward 
rate hypothesis. The strength of this approach is that the prediction error is a more accurate measure 
of forward rate biasedness than the regression beta estimate. Also the statistical issues related to the 
Fama regression including a low coefficient of determination and differences in variables variances 
may be neglected. Furthermore, the forward prediction error is a direct measure of forward contract 
yield applied by industry professionals. Hence the impact of biasedness on profitability is directly 
computable from the findings. In addition to the implications to profitability, the graphical depictions 
of one and five year biases are discussed and compared to each currency’s market imperfections, 
foreign exchange volume, historical exchange rate development and average size of forward 
premium.  
 
The five year forward rates used in this study are not actual OTC five year forward rates given the 
lack of data available. Instead they are synthetic in nature implying that the five year premium is 
approximated using the one year premiums. The five year premium is computed by adding up five 
consequent one year premiums, creating a seamless five year time line similarly as the actual five 
year premium would do. For illustration, the five year rates in figure 1 can be perceived as being 
constructed from subsequent one year premiums and the initial exchange rate. Alternatively, the five 
year forward premium could have been approximated by multiplying any given one year premium 
by five and the findings would not have been altered substantially because the forward premium has 
been so static during the sample. According to the foreign exchange risk manager of Metso 
Corporation, Mikko Vainikka, the selected method of computing cumulative one year premiums 
serves as a prudent proxy for the actual five year premium because the actual OTC traded five year 
premiums often carry an additional premium given the regulations on the OTC derivatives.     
 
The sample data consists of end-of-month mid-quotes for exchange rates and forward points, 
extracted from the Bloomberg terminal. Time period is from the beginning of 1999 until the start of 
year 2014, a selection stipulated by data availability. The forward points retrieved from Bloomberg 
terminal range from 1-month to 12-months. The countries chosen are Chile, Brazil and Mexico 
(South- and Central America), Czech Republic, South Africa and Turkey (EMEA9) , India, Indonesia 
and South Korea (Asia) and Russia. Criteria included geographical diversification, foreign exchange 
market functionality and, especially, data availability.  
                                                 
9EMEA stands for Europe, the Middle East and Africa.  
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1.3 Limitations of research 
The primary limitations of this research are the data availability, data overlap, incomplete time series 
robustness tests and the somewhat assumption based analysis of long-term results. The emerging 
market currency data is only available from 1999 onwards which is distinctively less than for major 
currencies, having valid data since 197310. The small sample size introduces peso problems, referring 
to low probability and high impact events that do not have time to materialize in small samples. 
Hence, it is pivotal to utilize all information available, leading to the selection of monthly data. 
Regressing variables with longer than one month horizons on a monthly data creates a data overlap 
issue, resulting in a moving average error process. This is relieved using Newey-West robust standard 
errors, a technique exercised in similar studies (e.g. Snaith, Coakley and Kellard, 2013; Beber, 
Breedon and Buraschi, 2010). In addition to the data overlap, the time series properties of the forward 
premium are slightly problematic. A thorough analysis would require the application of a mean-break 
detection methodology given the forward premium has been shown to have structural breaks (Baille 
and Cho, 2014). Another challenge is that the distant time horizon examinations of the forward 
prediction errors are analysed against slightly presumed market frictions because explicit data on e.g. 
the size and frequency of institutional interventions in emerging economies are rarely available. 
Finally, the five year forward rates are synthetic instead of actual rates.  
1.4 Empirical findings 
I find that the unbiased forward rate hypothesis in emerging economies is rejected in the short-term 
and, moreover, that the bias increases systematically with extending the time horizon, regardless of 
whether it is measured with the regression or the prediction error. Firstly, the proposition of Frankel 
and Poonwala (2010) of lesser biased short-term forward rates in the emerging economies is rejected 
according to the interpretation of the Fama regression findings. Secondly, the time horizon effect is 
found to be reversal to advanced economies; the forward bias escalates the further the maturity is 
extended. Finally, when the time horizon is extended sufficiently, i.e. from one to five years, the 
forward rate bias becomes positive consistently throughout the sample, implying that the five year 
forward rate is a systematically upwards biased predictor of future exchange rate during the sample 
time series. Especially the last-mentioned has drastic implications to hedging profitability.  
 
The Fama regression result interpretation is carried out by considering only the statistically significant 
slope coefficients. The unbiased forward rate hypothesis is rejected at the one month interval given 
                                                 
10 However, the OTC forward data even for major currencies may not be this lengthy. Those studies frequently use interest 
rate data instead. 1973 is the year when the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime is considered terminated.  
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the majority of the beta coefficient estimates are negative. The only outlier is Russian ruble, which 
has a beta close to unity but the exchange rate against the US dollar is highly controlled. When the 
maturity is lengthened incrementally to 12-months, for the currencies that the beta attains statistical 
significance, the bias increases systematically. In the regression, the forward bias is defined as the 
distance of the beta estimate from the desired unity value. In the advanced economies, the relationship 
has been found to be the opposite; increasing maturity inclines betas towards unity (Snaith, Coakley 
and Kellard, 2013). This is the main contribution: Increasing the maturity in the emerging market 
forward rates produces systematically more biased estimates of future exchange rate.  
 
The increase of forward bias together with maturity is confirmed with the graphical depiction of the 
forward prediction error for one and five year maturities, which is measured in exchange rate terms. 
The prediction error of five year forward rate is consistently greater than the prediction error of the 
one year forward rate for the majority of countries (Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Russia, 
South Africa and Turkey). Furthermore, the five year bias in these markets is continuously positive 
nearly throughout the sample. Positive prediction error signifies that the five year forward rate is an 
upwards biased predictor of future exchange rate. This is exactly what is assumed in the figure 1 and 
the preceding discussion. The extension of maturity results in the emergence of a systematic upwards 
forward bias. But is the reason in the size of the forward premium or in the trend of exchange rate 
decline?  
 
As the figure 1 demonstrates, there are only two mathematically plausible explanations for a 
consistently upwards biased forward rate; either the exchange rate has been on a declining trend all 
through the sample and/or the forward premium is sufficient to make a difference. These two factors 
vary in their significance between the currencies. For the Chilean peso and Czech koruna, the 
determinant of positive prediction error is mainly the trend of declining exchange rate given the 
average forward premiums near zero and the forward prediction error closely mimics the exchange 
rate developments. However, Brazilian real, Indonesian rupiah, Russian ruble, South African rand 
and Turkish lira experience at least some degree of exchange rate increase which means the forward 
premium has been sufficiently large to maintain the positive prediction error. Concurringly, for these 
currencies the average forward premiums are the sample highest. The most radical forward premium 
is in Turkey, and, interestingly enough, the Turkish lira against US dollar exchange rate has been on 
a remarkable surge during the sample (from USD/TRY 0.5 to USD/TRY 2.0). Nonetheless, the 
forward rate bias is consistently positive. The other exchange rates also experienced relatively 
substantial appreciation especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008 but the five year 
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rates remain upwards biased. Thus for these countries, it is the excessive size of the forward premium 
that accounts for the existence of a consistent positive five year bias. Neither the diverging market 
imperfections nor the foreign exchange volumes appear to convincingly explain the differences in the 
behavior of the forward bias in different currencies.  
 
A practical implication of a systematic positive five year forward bias is that committing to a five 
year forward rate has been either systematically profitable of loss-making depending on which 
currency the entity is selling and which buying with the forward contract. The forward has been 
unprofitable if the forward is agreed to sell emerging market currency and buy advanced market 
currency (US dollar) and profitable if the forward has been agreed to buy emerging market currency 
and sell USD. The profitable alternative is analogous to the profitability of carry trade because the 
effective impact of such forward rate is to take a speculative view, or long position, in the emerging 
market currency. The implication to hedging is that carrying out risk management that involves 
committing to the described unprofitable forward rates has been resulting in loss through the entire 
sample. For instance, these forwards could be used to hedge sales of an advanced economy based 
company that are denominated in emerging market currency. According to Metso Corporation, many 
industrial companies currently have well predictable distant horizon inflow from emerging economies 
given the increased popularity of long-term industrial service contracts. The strength of 
aforementioned findings does not stem from a statistical method e.g. computing an average profit or 
using a mean-variance optimization. Instead, it is based on the finding of a systematic and consistent 
positive bias, throughout the sample.   
1.5 Structure 
First, I will discuss the surrounding literature from forward rate unbiasedness tests to suggested 
explanations of the forward premium anomaly, which is followed by the presentation of the 
hypotheses set for this research. Then the data set is described and analysed, followed by the 
presentation of the methodology, including the Fama regression model and the derivative return 
specification. Finally, results are presented and discussed in conjunction with the findings from the 
existing literature. The conclusions section completes this paper.   
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2 Literature review 
In this section I review the literature most relevant for this research. First, the uncovered interest rate 
parity is introduced on a general level followed by discussion of most prominent empirical results. 
The standard tests of the uncovered interest parity are run with a monthly data interval employing a 
regular regression model. Second, the impact of extending time horizon as well as the impact of 
employing alternate versions of the regression model are discussed. All in all, these empirical findings 
are mostly in agreement with each other; in short, the parity theory is rejected. Therefore, the third 
part of the literature review presents the main explanations of the parity failure, including central 
bank interventions, time-varying risk premium and econometric misspecification. The final part of 
this chapter introduces the few studies that deploy emerging market currency data.   
2.1 Introduction to the uncovered interest rate parity 
The uncovered interest rate parity belongs to the branch of international finance literature that intends 
to forecast exchange rates, see e.g. Rossi (2013) for a great review. Other factors often used to predict 
FX rates include price and inflation differentials as well as output and productivity differentials. The 
UIP is, however, fundamentally different from these other predictors because the interest rate 
differentials it examines are the basis of FX forward rates. Moreover, the OTC foreign exchange 
market is incredibly liquid; in 2013 it reached an average daily volume of over five trillion US 
dollars11, implying that the forward rates are of significant practical importance. In addition to the 
interested counterparties in the foreign exchange market, the academic intrigue for studying the 
uncovered interest rate parity is considerable stemming from the research findings. In summary, the 
uncovered interest rate parity, or the unbiased forward rate hypothesis, has been consistently rejected 
and, moreover, the academic literature has found it difficult to explain why (Engel, 1996).  
 
The theory behind the UIP is relatively simple: two currencies have two different interest rates and 
for the investments to be equally attractive, the exchange rate should be expected to appreciate or 
depreciate in accordance with the difference in these rates. For example suppose the one year dollar 
interest rate is 10% and the comparable euro interest rate is 6%, then the interest rate differential is 
roughly 4%12. Thus risk neutral and rational investors should expect the dollar to depreciate by 4% 
against euro over the next year (Froot and Thaler, 1990). This relationship is called the uncovered 
interest rate parity. From the above dynamics it results that the interest rate differential equals the 
                                                 
11 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/bis-survey-volumes-idUSL6N0GZ34R20130905 
12 This is not exactly correct but the presentation in corresponding literature is always similar. The correct definition is 
that the dollar would be excepted to depreciate by = 1 – [(1+10%)/(1+6%)] = 3.7% which is only approximately equal to 
the simplified calculation above.  
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forward premium of a forward rate that has the same maturity as the interest rates. Otherwise there 
would be a direct arbitrage opportunity, assuming all these instruments are accessible, a theory known 
as the covered interest rate parity (Engel, 1996). The foundation of the forward premium is 
particularly interesting since it is a pure mathematical computation and not, at least directly, reflecting 
the market expectations of future exchange rates.  
2.2 The UIP and the time horizon effect 
The forward rate unbiasedness is frequently examined with the following, previously cited as, Fama 
(1984) regression: (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡+𝑖), where (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) is the change in 
exchange rate and (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) is the forward premium, i.e. the difference between spot rate now and 
the forward rate for time period i. In the Fama regression model the null hypothesis tested is (𝛽 = 1) 
and (𝑎 = 0) under the assumptions of risk neutrality and rational expectations (Froot and Thaler, 
1990). Froot and Thaler (1990) survey evidence from previous studies concluding an average (𝛽 = -
0.88) over 75 studies which implies a clear rejection of the null hypothesis. In a more recent study 
using short horizon data and traditional methods, Frankel and Poonawala (2010) find an average (𝛽 =
−4) for developed economies with a sample of 1996 – 2004. In a survey covering mainstream 
currencies, Engel (1996) points out a corresponding average beta estimate over an abundance of 
articles. It can be concluded that slope estimates in range of (−0.5 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ −4) are all consensus 
values for advanced economies when short horizon data is used. Thus, it is difficult to establish a 
precise benchmark for a beta estimate for this study.  
 
When the time horizon is extended from the traditional one month, there is a slight consensus of better 
performance of the uncovered interest rate parity for the established market currencies. Snaith, 
Coakley and Kellard (2013) suggest that the unbiasedness emerges between two to five year horizons 
depending on the exchange rate in question. They run the Fama regressions with monthly 
observations from a sample consisting of historically the most liquid currencies: Canadian dollar, 
Deutsche mark, Japanese yen, Swiss franc and the US dollar. Lothian and Wu (2011) provide 
supportive evidence of the time horizon effect as they find unbiased slope estimates using currencies 
French franc and the US dollar against the British pound with a sample ranging from 1803 to 1999, 
for both short- and long-term variables with the latter with greater predictive ability. However, on a 
critical note, out of these two exchange rates only one, franc against sterling attains a beta statistically 
not different from one, while the other does not. The USD/GBP actually remains quite far from the 
desired unity value with betas of 0.14 (short rate) and 0.38 (long rate). Hence, based on one currency 
pair out of the two possible Lothian and Wu (2011) make a conclusion that the uncovered interest 
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rate parity holds when the period is extended sufficiently. In addition, they find that the beta estimates 
do become negative, concurring with the existing literature, when the sample is dominated by 
observations from the recent decades.  
 
There is also evidence proposing that the uncovered interest parity does not improve with longer 
horizon but instead is dependent on the exchange rate. Bekaert, Wei and Yuhang (2007) find using a 
vector autoregression (VAR) that the parity holds well for certain currencies regardless of the time 
horizon, namely the US dollar against Deutsche mark, but reject the hypothesis for all maturities for 
GBP/USD and GBP/DEM. The sample construction is quite similar to other studies as it consists of 
established currencies, monthly observations and data from 1971 to 1996. Thus, at this point, the 
results can be interpreted quite valid evidence against any time period conditional dynamics in the 
parity relationship. However, again a more exact scrutiny reveals that with one of the two model 
specifications, Bekaert, Wei and Yuhang (2007) actually do accept the UIP for long horizon only, for 
the GBP/ USD pair. This leads to question of the impact of the intrinsic model specification and the 
variable selection to the regression output. Furthermore, Snaith, Coakley and Kellard (2013) argue 
that vector autoregression is not a well suited method for testing the horizon effect because, if 
misspecified, the interpretation of long-run results in particular becomes unclear. Nevertheless, the 
horizon effect did not pass the VAR inspection even with a fairly large sample.  
 
The uncovered interest rate parity has also shown to depend on the time period of the sample given 
that different studies have found similar beta coefficient estimates for similar time periods. These 
examinations have been mainly conducted with rolling regressions with an appropriate window. With 
their sizable data set covering two centuries, Lothian and Wu (2011) run rolling regressions finding 
that the beta estimates became negative only when the subsample is dominated by the 1970s or the 
1980s. In agreement, using a five year window in regressions, Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) find that 
slope coefficient is highly variable and that it is especially negative during the 1980s. Also Baillie 
and Cho (2014) verify these observations and in addition note that the 1990s experience substantial 
negative beta estimates that are occasionally followed by a reversal effect after the year 2008. These 
findings suggest significant time variation in the parity relationship. In particular, the discovery of 
changing dynamics after the middle 1970s concurs with the date of termination of the fixed exchange 
rate regime. Hence, extending the sample beyond the floating rate era which generally started in 
197313 should be questioned and the conclusions drawn from such studies be properly challenged.  
                                                 
13 The Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates was terminated in 1973, see e.g. Lothian (1986). 
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2.3 Theories intending to explain the forward premium anomaly 
Although, explaining the existence of the forward premium anomaly is not in the primary objectives 
of this research, it is beneficial to go through the most important articles covering this area since it 
allows a more thorough discussion of the results to be discovered. The proposed explanations are 
abundant, including a time-varying risk premium, investor estimation errors, peso problems, omitted 
impact of central bank interventions and econometric misspecification. None of these theories have 
been generally accepted as a consensus explanation for the historical failure of the uncovered interest 
rate parity.  
 
One of the most popular explanations in the academic literature has been the risk premium approach, 
which proposes that conditional on efficient and rational forward market, any forward rate can be 
broken down into expected spot rate 𝐸(𝑠𝑡+𝑖) that is a rational and efficient forecast given all 
information available and a risk premium (Fama, 1984). Thus, in equation form the forward premium 
can be broken down as follows, where the first term in brackets is viewed as the risk premium: 𝑓𝑡
𝑖 −
𝑠𝑡 = [𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑠𝑡+𝑖)] + [𝐸(𝑠𝑡+𝑖) − 𝑠𝑡] (Backus, Foresi and Telmer, 2001). This definition stipulates 
the following statistical requirements for the risk premium: given the found negative beta coefficient 
estimate, variance in the risk premium should exceed the variance of expected spot return (𝐸(𝑠𝑡+𝑖) −
𝑠𝑡). This property has been proven particularly difficult to document (Maynard and Phillips, 2001). 
The academic literature has repeatedly failed in endeavours to reconcile the Fama (1984) 
requirements for a risk premium and empirical findings (Engel, 1996). 
 
The Fama’s (1984) definition of a risk premium is still of academic intrigue as it has been attempted 
to include in novel methods of explaining the failure of uncovered interest rate parity. Backus, Foresi 
and Telmer (2001) test affine term structure models, which have been found to estimate well single-
currency yields, by restricting the pricing kernels by the statistical conditions of the Fama’s time-
varying risk premium. They conclude that the affine models do not explain or have difficulty in 
explaining the forward premium anomaly. In addition, there have been several models that have 
intended to statistically model the risk premium, even general equilibrium models that consider 
consumer utility functions for domestic and foreign output as well as portfolio-balance models that 
optimize utility from domestic and foreign fixed income investments (Engel, 1996). However, with 
any plausible degree of risk aversion and standard models, the risk premium has been proven difficult 
to validate (Engel, 1996).    
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A logical extension of the risk premium approach has been to investigate whether foreign exchange 
volatility accounts for the forward premium anomaly. The studies modelling volatility have been 
somewhat successful, if a positive, yet different from unity, estimate can be perceived as such. 
Clarida, Davis and Pedersen (2009) run the one month Fama regression and find negative slope 
estimates only for low volatility states and positive, yet different from unity, estimates for high 
volatility states. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of returns for a 3v3 carry trade 
portfolio. The 3v3 carry portfolio is constructed by equal weighted long positions in the three highest 
yielding and short positions in the three lowest yielding currencies. To define the FX volatility 
through carry trade returns might be slightly problematic because it takes into account only a 
proportion of currencies in the sample and the yields by construction consider not only the exchange 
rate market but also the interest rates. Another novel proponents of time-varying risk premium 
approach are Beber, Breedon and Buraschi (2010) who study the impact of heterogeneous beliefs on 
foreign exchange implied volatility and future currency returns. They find that the effect of increased 
funding liquidity problems14 turns short-term Fama regression slope estimate from negative to 
positive while controlled with a difference in beliefs variable15. Given that the dispersion in beliefs 
attained statistical significance, it was concluded to be a risk factor in the currency markets, and thus 
supportive of the time-varying risk premium explanation of the forward premium anomaly.  
 
The institutional interventions and other market imperfections are another innovative point of view.  
Mark and Moh (2007) examine the impact of central bank interventions on the uncovered interest 
rate parity. They find run the Fama regression separately for so called institutional intervention 
periods and non-intervention periods for USD/DM and USD/JPY with a weekly data16. They find 
betas closing the unbiased forward rate hypothesis when the interventions are excluded, proposing 
that the interventions account for the anomaly. The obvious problem with the study is that it employs 
a one week time interval which is unconventional and thus infeasible for a direct comparison. Also 
the amount observations in the intervention periods is extremely low. Nevertheless, the potential for 
an institutional intervention to substantially impact the uncovered interest rate parity condition is an 
interesting approach, because it seems only rational that if the central bank either intervenes directly 
the markets using its reserves, the exchange market is immediately distorted, or the central bank 
                                                 
14 Funding liquidity is measured with TED spread: The difference between three-month London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) Eurodollar rate and the three-month US T-bill rate. 
15 Measured with analyst forecasts of exchange rates in Reuters.  
16 US dollar against Japanese yen and US dollar against Deutsche mark. 
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adjusts its key interest rates directly altering the interest rate differential17. All these economic 
explanations appear feasible but none of them achieves a truly dominant status, resistant of acute 
critique. From such disparate findings emerge the controversy for the econometric foundation of the 
variables employed in the regressions.   
2.4 Econometric properties and issues of the UIP 
The empirical studies recurrently encounter similar issues in their examinations: The models have 
low R-squared ratios, the exchange rate has substantially greater variance than the forward premium 
and the forward premium displays persistent autocorrelations. Especially the extremely low variance 
of the forward premium is of paramount concern. In addition, small sample size is often found 
problematic.  
 
One of the foremost obstacles confronted in all studies of unbiasedness or UIP is the nearly always 
recorded low R-squared ratio or the coefficient of determination. The R-squared measures the 
proportion of variance of the dependent variable that is explained with the variance of the independent 
variable. This ratio has often been in the scale of 1% - 5 % which means that the forward premium 
explains only a few percentages of the changes in the exchange rate in question (see, e.g. Backus, 
Foresi and Telmer, 2001; Frankel and Poonwala, 2010). Furthermore, it is indicative of low goodness 
of fit of the models deployed. Taking all this under consideration, it would be easy to conclude that 
the model specification should be improved by including omitted variables or by fitting a more 
advanced statistical method than the standard OLS regression. However, it needs to be emphasized 
that despite abundant effort there is neither single specific model that would have been proven a 
superior fit nor any consistent success achieved by introducing new variables (Rossi, 2013).  
 
The notably lower variance of the forward premium has orientated a branch of the literature towards 
scrutinizing its impact on the time series properties of the variables. The exchange rate is often 
documented to have unit root and to be stationary at first difference which implies that the variable 
deployed, (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡), is stationary (Engel, 1996). The complication arises from the unclear nature of 
the forward premium and the implications of explaining changes in a stationary spot series. If the 
forward premium is concluded non-stationary, i.e. it has an order of integration of (0.5 < 𝑑 < 1), 
then estimates of 𝛽 are inconsistent (Maynard and Phillips, 2001). On other hand, if the order of 
integration is in between (0 < 𝑑 < 0.5), 𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡 is stationary and estimates of 𝛽 are consistent and 
                                                 
17 Assuming that risk-free deposit rates are based on central bank reference rates. On the other hand, for long-term rates 
oftentimes government bond interests are used which might not react equally sharply to central bank decisions.  
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the Fama regression is balanced (Engel, 1996; Maynard and Phillips, 2001). Maynard and Phillips 
(2001) find that the premium is non-stationary with estimated range: (0.5 < 𝑑 < 1). This result 
implies a fractionally integrated process where the forward premium has a long-memory and is highly 
persistent. Hence, Maynard and Phillips (2001) reject the unbiasedness hypothesis in the test’s current 
construction, suggesting an introduction of some unknown omitted variable to balance the equation. 
There are, however, difference of opinion in the literature as the forward premium has frequently 
been found stationary (Engel, 1996). Baillie and Cho (2014) arrive on different implications as they 
propose that the premium in fact does not have a constant order integration at all but instead it 
fluctuates through time resulting from structural breaks.  
 
The time series properties of the spot and forward rate are far from consensus and the possibility of 
omitted variable bias is often expressed but also infinite sample issue has been discussed (Maynard 
and Phillips, 2001). Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) take a novel approach in considering an artificially 
generated time series for (𝑓𝑡
𝑖) and (𝑠𝑡+𝑖). They suggest that the forward premium anomaly may be 
viewed as a statistical artefact given small sample sizes and persistent autocorrelation in the forward 
premium. Sakoulis, Zivot and Choi (2010) proceeds with these finite sample issues by carrying out 
Monte Carlo simulations of the Fama regressions with and without the inclusion of structural breaks. 
They find that, on the contrary, when the structural breaks in the mean of forward premium are 
accounted for, the forward premium is not anymore as persistent as it is perceived to be. In more 
detail, Sakoulis, Zivot and Choi (2010) show that the unbiasedness should not be rejected based on 
e.g. the traditional Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root, because they produce a distorted 
values as such. They also find that if the breaks are not incorporated the beta estimates are biased 
downwards, away from the desired unity coefficient.  
 
The issue with the simulated sample sets of, such as Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) as well as Sakoulis,  
Zivot and Choi (2010), include the lack of economic explanation as well as infeasibility to time 
horizon effect examination. Even though the forward premium’s structural breaks or the long-
memory would to some extent explain the anomaly, the aforementioned studies do not properly 
account for the economic rationale behind the findings. Why is there a structural break and why 
exactly does it make the regression estimates biased? As the forward premium has a very low 
variance, it is difficult to accept that the one time it changes substantially the effect should be excluded 
from the analysis. Furthermore, I presume the simulation models always have some author sensitive, 
subjective restrictions on the data formation process that may lead to significantly different results 
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between studies. The statistical properties of the sample data set in this study will be extensively 
discussed in the data and results sections. Especially the low variance of the forward premium and its 
applicability to a regression model in general are of great interest.  
2.5 Forward rate unbiasedness in emerging economies 
The emerging market currencies provide a novel spark to the traditional tests of forward rate 
unbiasedness given the exchange rates function in a fundamentally different manner and given the 
currencies are often used as the investment currencies in carry trades (see, e.g. FT.com18). The 
emerging market exchange rates against US dollar are presumed to have been on a declining trend 
and to have substantial forward premiums. Both of these indicate to an extensive failure of the 
uncovered interest rate parity but surprisingly, the academic literature currently suggests that the 
forward rates are less biased in the emerging economies in comparison to advanced economies 
(Frankel and Poonwala, 2010). Currently the literature examining the unbiased forward rate 
hypothesis in the emerging economies is extremely scarce.  
 
The carry trade is based on a strategy of investing in high yield currencies, commonly EM currencies, 
and funding the investment with a low-cost currency, such as Japanese yen or US dollar (see, e.g. 
Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf, 2012; Clarida, Davis and Pedersen, 2009). The 
profitability of the strategy is basically based on the failure of the uncovered interest rate parity: The 
EM currency is not expected not depreciate sufficiently to make the investment unprofitable. 
However, the carry trade studies are not clear tests of the uncovered interest rate parity because the 
portfolios are often adjusted monthly to have a basket highest yielding currencies, in which case the 
currencies invested in may fluctuate during the sample and the exact proportion of investment 
currencies during the carry are seldom reported (Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf, 2012; 
Doukas and Zhang, 2013). Nevertheless, the finding of profitable carry trade strategies leads to 
presume that the forward bias anomaly could be fundamentally different from what has been 
historically documented for major currencies.    
 
The number of studies measuring the forward rate bias in emerging economies is relatively limited. 
Mostly this is probably due to the scarce amount of FX data and in some cases quite regulated 
markets. Both the time horizon and basic monthly data comparisons have been carried out to a slight 
extent. Frankel and Poonwala (2010) study the short term UIP for a sample of 14 emerging market 
                                                 
18 http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/10/01/parsing-em-vulnerability-to-carry-trade-unwinding/ 
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currencies with non-overlapping data for a period of 1996 – 2004. They reject the null hypothesis of 
(𝛽 = 1) but when comparing to industrialized economies for the same time period, they find an 
average (𝛽 = −4.3) for the advanced economies, while for emerging economies they find 𝛽 to 
average slightly over zero with more positive than negative coefficients. They conclude this result 
being indicative of less bias in the interest rate differential of developing FX markets. This 
interpretation defies intuition because it is common knowledge that there is less liquidity and more 
frictions in these markets. Furthermore the widely documented profitability of carry trade strategy 
suggests that the UIP should fail particularly in these examinations, not the other way around.  
 
The volume of articles examining the term effect in emerging economies is clearly in need of 
complementing studies. The only studies I found where papers by Kumar and Trück (2014) exploring 
unbiasedness and risk premiums in the Indian currency futures markets and by Sarmidi and Norlida 
(2011) examining UIP for different time horizons for 15 emerging markets. Kumar and Trück (2014) 
run the Fama regression for 1-month through 3-month futures contracts on Indian rupee (INR) against 
the US dollar (USD). They reject unbiasedness for two and three months with (𝛽 = 1.8) while for the 
1-month period the null hypothesis is not rejected. This finding, more in favour of the UIP for short 
horizons, is conflicting with the evidence from advanced economies as discussed in section 2.1. 
However, when more currencies are included, the impact of time horizon reverses to correspond with 
existing literature19.  Sarmidi and Norlida (2011) study with interest rate differentials for one, three 
and twelve month intervals finding positive but rejected coefficient estimates for short horizon while 
the 12-month period brings 𝛽 estimates close to unity as stated by the UIP. Their data set ranges from 
1995-2009, and is composed of deposit rates instead of forward rates and the currency pairs are mixed 
and matched with three major currencies. These aforementioned studies are clearly in need of 
supplementing research.  
 
All in all, the literature has found that UIP does not hold well with actual data and the explanations 
are abundant. For major currencies the betas are found to be significantly different from unity and 
even having a negative sign, which means that the parity does not even estimate correctly the direction 
of the change in exchange rate. However for the major currencies, long time horizons have produced 
some improvement in results. The explanations of the forward premium anomaly include peso 
problems, heterogeneous beliefs, persistent autocorrelation of the forward premium, finite sample 
                                                 
19 Futures differ from forward contracts since the former are marked-to-market daily and they can only be issued for 
specific dates and in specific currency lots. Forwards are, on the contrary, executable for any banking day for any 
underlying amount and, moreover, for a hedger, their counterpart is a bank while in futures it is an exchange.   
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bias, institutional interventions and time-varying risk premium. Out of these, the most promising 
results have generated the econometric examinations and from economic perspective the effects of 
central bank interventions. The emerging market currencies provide a new and presumably highly 
fruitful testing ground for these established theories of uncovered interest rate parity since the EM 
currencies are novel, still quite frictional in functionality and have far greater variable values and 
variances to the extent that hedging the foreign exchange exposures has become a predominant source 
of headache for multinational companies’ risk managers.  
 
The hypotheses are formed in two distinct parts. The first set of hypotheses is more based on the 
aforementioned literature review; given the finding that the uncovered interest rate parity has been 
predominantly rejected for the standard one month maturity as well as to perform better along with 
extended time horizon, the same dynamics are expected to be shown in the emerging economies. The 
regression model is estimated to produce different from unity beta estimates at the short interval but 
to approach unity along with extended time horizons. The second part of the tests executed is not 
equally similar to previous academic papers neither in terms of methodology nor hypotheses. Given 
the several econometric issues that have been assumed to impair the Fama regression model, I will 
use a different approach for the long-term tests; for the maturities of one and five years, the forward 
rate biasedness is measured in exchange rate terms. It is simply a graphical depiction of the forecast 
error between a forward rate and the exchange rate it intended to estimate. The potential for a model 
misspecification, time series issues or the shown low volatility of the forward premium do not cause 
statistical interference for the described, simplified, inspection. On the contrary, if the behaviour of 
the forward premium is as highly stabile as it is assumed to be given the existing findings, the forward 
rate biasedness and time horizon effect will be facile and productive to analyse graphically.   
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3 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses to be tested are presented below followed by a clarifying commentary. These are 
employed for the data and models explained in the following chapter. There are four hypotheses set 
for this study. The first two investigate the unbiased forward rate hypothesis with a regression model 
that employs short-term data, ranging from one to twelve months. The second two hypotheses study 
the UIP in extended horizons by comparing one and five year time horizons. The methodology for 
the latter two is a simplified graphical inspection of the difference between a forward rate and the 
future exchange rate, i.e. the forward prediction error. The aim is to allow for a more detailed 
discussion of the findings as well as to neglect issues with econometric modelling.  
 
The unbiased forward rate hypothesis suggests, as is indicated by its title, that a forward rate agreed 
at time t for a period i is an unbiased predictor of the future exchange rate that realizes synchronously 
with the forward contract i.e. exchange rate at time t+i. If the statement is valid then the null 
hypothesis is accepted and the regression equation (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡+1) produces 
statistically significant coefficient estimates (𝛽 = 1) and (𝑎 = 0). The latter, (𝑎 = 0), is of less 
interest and is rarely discussed in related articles.  
 
H1: Statistically significant 𝛽 = 1 and 𝑎 = 0 from Fama regression for forward rate with maturity 
(i=1-, 3-, 6-, 12-months) 
 
The null hypothesis is tested for the aforementioned time horizons separately with currencies 
exhibited in the following section. If the null is accepted for any maturity it implies that the forward 
quote in question consistently forecasts the future spot rate accurately. Even if this hypothesis would 
be rejected the beta estimate can give valuable information in comparison to vast existing literature. 
For instance, a negative coefficient estimate implies not only a strong bias but also a systematic 
tendency of an increase in forward premium to be followed by a decline in exchange and vice versa. 
The literature usually measures the extent of forward rate or interest rate differential bias with the 
magnitude and the sign of the beta. In practice, the greater the difference of the estimated beta 
coefficient from unity, which is proposed by the null hypothesis, the greater the bias.  
 
H2: 𝛽 is closer to unity for longer maturity contracts: 12-months in comparison to 1-month.  
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The second hypothesis tested assumes that the beta approaches unity when the time horizon is 
extended up to one year. Hence, it tests the time horizon effect of the uncovered interest rate parity 
that frequently has been found to produce promising results in the advanced economies (Snaith, 
Coakley and Kellard 2013; Lothian and Wu, 2011). Related studies focusing on emerging markets 
have found concurring results, although such studies are remarkably limited (Sarmidi and Norlida, 
2011). Consequently, in line with existing studies the beta is estimated to approach unity, although, 
not necessarily reach it. A growing discrepancy from (𝛽 = 1), on the other hand, would be suggestive 
of escalating bias and a clearer rejection of the uncovered interest rate parity. The maturity is restricted 
to 12-months in this hypothesis. The subsequent horizons are not examined with regression for two 
reasons: The data overlap is concluded to distort findings excessively if multiple years would be 
measured on a monthly interval and because the descriptive examination of the longer time periods 
allows for more detailed discussion. As Snaith, Coakley and Kellard (2013) argue, the Newey-West 
regression is not a comprehensive response to the overlapping sample issue.  
 
H3: Forward rate biasedness disappears at distant time horizons: from one to five years. 
 
The third hypothesis is similar to the second one but it is formulated slightly different given the 
difference in methodology employed. When the time horizon is extended further from the 12-months 
to include five years, the methodology is changed from the Fama regression specification to graphical 
a depiction of forward prediction error or forward rate bias. Here, the bias is measured in exchange 
rate terms with the difference between the future exchange rate and a forward rate committed to in a 
previous period: (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖). This examination is analogous to the original Fama regression, (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 =
𝛼 +  𝛽 (𝑓𝑡
𝑖) + 𝜀𝑡+1), in that if the unbiasedness in this regression holds, then (𝛽 = 1) and (𝑎 = 0) 
resulting in (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 = 𝑓𝑡
𝑖) which implies a zero forward prediction error: (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖 = 0). Hence, if the 
unbiasedness disappears along with time horizon or the bias was to decrease, the variable values of 
(𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖) would approach zero.  
 
The choice of utilizing a more simplified approach in terms of econometric complexity was a 
deliberate one to achieve additional objectives set for this study. The varying statistical issues related 
to regressing a potentially long-memory, low volatility, forward premium with a difference-stationary 
exchange rate may be neglected. Subsequently in this thesis, especially the low variance of the 
forward premium will be assumed somewhat impair the regression model. In addition, measuring the 
prediction error gives directly information on the profitability of the forward rates. The unique 
 22 
  
possibility to even analyse such a hypothesis stems from the exceptionally high interest rate 
differentials and the historical tendencies and trends assumed to characterize the emerging market 
currencies. The hypothesis 4 below elaborates this line of thought.  
 
H4: The forward bias grows substantially when the time horizon is extended from one to five years to 
the extent that the five year forward bias is one-sided and positive, implying that the five year forward 
rate is a systematically upwards biased predictor of future exchange rate. 
 
The final and fourth hypothesis studies whether the forward bias is sufficiently substantial and 
systematic that the prediction becomes positive consistently when the forward maturity is increased 
from one to five years. The only maturities explored in detail are one and five years because this 
method of graphical inspection requires sufficiently clear findings. This hypothesis is tested in 
conjunction with the hypothesis 3 which measures the forward prediction error as means to measure 
the forward unbiasedness at distant time horizons of one and five years. The hypothesis 4 is in a way 
contradictive to hypothesis 3, because it assumes that long term forward rates are actually 
systematically and one-sidedly biased, which means that the forward rates are assumed to predict the 
future exchange rate incorrectly and consistently upwards. This presumption is based on the essential 
characteristics of emerging market currencies.  
 
The emerging economies allow to test such hypothesis since they are well-known to have substantial 
interest rate differentials against developed economies, which is a fundamental difference to exchange 
rates that consist of only major currencies. The direct reason for the interest rate differential is that 
emerging market currencies have exceptionally high interest rates and, in comparison, the interest 
rates for advanced economies have been historically insignificant (Lothian and Wu, 2011). The 
interest rate differential is equal to the forward premium assuming covered interest rate parity (Engel, 
1996). Consequently, in this setting, the forward rates are substantially larger than the current 
exchange rates. The unusually high forward rates together with the presumed or perhaps even well-
known tendency of the exchange rates to fall, inspired to construct the hypothesis 4. When the time 
horizon is extended sufficiently, the spot rate is expected to always end up in a smaller value than the 
forward contract, even if at shorter maturities this hypothesis would not materialize. The short-
horizon failure of the hypothesis 4 is actually a presumption given the emerging market currency 
specific high volatility and sudden market movements. Hence, the longer the maturity of the 
derivative, the higher the probability of it ending up consistently higher than the exchange rate.  
 
 23 
  
Figure 2 illustrates the foundation for the hypothesis 4. It plots the historical USD/BRL spot rate for 
the sample period and two completely hypothetical forward curves are drawn. The forward curves 
consist of five annual forward rates from one to five years. The key take-away is to understand the 
above contemplations in conjunction with the figure: If the exchange rate is on a trend of descending, 
committing to forward rate for multiple years, trading at a substantial premium, creates a high-
probability of the forward rate to be higher than the future exchange rate. This, furthermore, implies 
a significant profitability impact. The relation between profitability or costliness and the forward bias 
is elaborated in methodology section. In addition, the construction of five year forward rates are 
discussed and presented in the methodology section because the five year forward rate used is 
synthetic instead of an actual OTC quote.  
 
Figure 2: Basis for hypothesis 4: USD/BRL rate and hypothetical forward rates 
Figure 2 shows the actual historical USD/BRL exchange rate during the sample time line from 1999-2014. In addition 
there are two theoretical forward rate lines starting in 2005 and 2008 respectively. They illustrate the difference between 
committing to one, two… or five year forward rates: marked similarly rest of this paper as (𝑓𝑡
1,2…5
), where the superscript 
denotes the maturity in years. The dashed lines are the differences to current spot market, i.e. the forward rate prediction 
error or the profitability compared to an unhedged position in the spot market. The point is to show that the substantial 
forward premiums in conjunction with the trend of exchange rate decline, may result in highly costly commitments, as in 
the case of the first forward curve initiated at 2005. The profitability or costliness is of course a two-way road, depending 
on the entity’s exposure. The forward curves are not based on actual data and the underlying actual forward curve may 
or may not be as linear as depicted below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑓𝑡
1 
𝑓𝑡
2 
𝑓𝑡
3 
𝑓𝑡
2 
𝑓𝑡
3 
𝑓𝑡
5 
𝑓𝑡
4 
𝑓𝑡
4 
𝑓𝑡
5 
 24 
  
In the next section, the data set and methodologies are discussed. Methodology part is dominated by 
the equations presented in this hypothesis section, although, also additional tests will be carried out.  
Data set, its properties and justification of all choices are described. Data and methodology chapter 
will be followed by a results section that goes through the empirical findings and compares them to 
abovementioned hypotheses. Will a substantial positive forward bias materialize on the one or five 
year maturity in emerging market currencies as is assumed in hypothesis 4? Or is the time horizon 
effect similar to what has been found in the advanced economies; systematically better performance 
of the UIP along with extending the time horizon, as stated by hypotheses 2 and 3?  
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4 Data and methodology 
The sample data set and methodologies are presented below. The sample currencies are described in 
terms of data availability and foreign exchange market characteristics. Following the breakdown and 
comparison of currencies, the statistical properties of the spot and forward rates are presented. Their 
standard deviations, mean values and unit root properties are tested and the impact of the results on 
the feasibility of running a regression model are discussed. The data section will be frequently re-
examined when the findings are discussed, in particular, the different sizes of the forward premiums 
among the sample currencies and the overall imperfectness of each market. The methodology section 
4.2 presents the Newey-West regression selected to be employed for the short-term data as well as 
the forward rate forecast error which is plotted for the long-term data.  
4.1 Data 
First, the sample data set is described in broad terms taking into consideration the countries selected, 
data availability, market imperfections and monetary policies. The rationale is to understand how the 
exchange rates might develop or behave in relation to their foreign exchange market functionality.  
Furthermore, this part of the coverage is in particular useful regarding the long-term UIP findings 
which is a descriptive examination in nature, involving substantial target market analysis and 
contemplation. The second part of the data section considers the statistical properties of the variables 
of the Fama regression. Areas of focus include variables’ mean values, standard deviations and 
stationarity characteristics.   
4.1.1 Sample data set description  
The decision is to use monthly data for ten different currencies with a common base currency the US 
dollar implying a quotation USD/emerging market currency. The countries chosen are Chile, Brazil 
and Mexico (South- and Central America), Czech Republic, South Africa and Turkey (EMEA20) , 
India, Indonesia and South Korea (Asia) and Russia. The countries were selected to get a 
geographically diverse group, as much data as possible and as little regulated as possible in the context 
of developing countries. The selection process was conducted by going through lists of countries 
classified as emerging21, narrowing down to ones with as liberal exchange rate policy as possible and, 
finally, to check for data availability of both exchange rate and forward points in the Bloomberg 
terminal.  E.g. China was excluded because yuan’s slim fluctuation band and Peru given the scarcity 
of data. The data availability was especially exclusive because OTC forward data is not well available 
                                                 
20 EMEA stands for Europe, the Middle East and Africa.  
21 MSCI emerging markets index, Nordea emerging markets fact book 2013 and Bloomberg list for “Best Emerging 
Markets Countries 2014”.  
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for the emerging economies. Furthermore, the limited number of currencies is efficient for a thorough 
analysis of an unknown area.  
 
The sample is described in table 1. The functionality of each currency is evaluated on three categories; 
the restrictions of forward market, general foreign exchange regime and the central bank objectives. 
If the forward market is restricted, the foreign exchange market is split into two, the offshore and 
onshore market. The offshore market is for forward contracts called the non-deliverable forward 
market (NDF) which means that these forwards have a cash settlement instead of a physical delivery 
(Doukas and Zhang, 2013). In practice, the cash settlement implies that the NDF is settled only in 
one currency which would be e.g. US dollar if the NDF was made for US dollar and South Korean 
won. The existence of the NDF market is based on the desire of offshore investors to hedge or 
speculate in a forward market but the local alternative is restricted by capital controls, currency 
convertibility restrictions or there is a lack of liquidity in the domestic market (Doukas and Zhang, 
2013; Park, 2001). Hence, even the covered interest rate parity might not hold in these markets if the 
domestic risk-free investments are not available for foreign investors given market restrictions 
(Doukas and Zhang, 2013). Therefore, the forward point data used in this research, which is preferred 
over the alternative of actual interest rate data, is highly suitable for the purposes of examining the 
unbiased forward rate hypothesis.  
 
The other two categories of market imperfections, in addition to the tradability of forward contracts, 
are the current foreign exchange regime and the monetary policy to the extent that what are the 
objectives and authorizations of the central or reserve bank. The foreign exchange regimes can be 
divided into floating, fixed and a managed float. An exchange rate is conventionally considered as 
fixed, if the bilateral exchange rate stays within +/- 2% band during a calendar year (Tamgac, 2013). 
The managed float, however, often has a predetermined band within which the exchange rate is let 
fluctuate but the band is broader than for the fixed regimes (Tamgac, 2013). Alternatively, the central 
bank may apply a managed float by controlling the currency’s volatility with no pre-specified range 
of allowed values. The currencies in this sample are mostly floating which implies a free 
determination of exchange rate by the market forces. The final category is the monetary policy of 
each market because it differentiates the floating regimes from one another; is the currency truly 
freely determined or does the central bank intervene the markets regardless of the stated floating 
regime? 
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Table 1: FX market imperfections in sample countries and data set description 
This table reports countries for which exchange rate data is used, respective currency codes, data availability and monetary policies. USD is the base (or numerator) currency 
for all FX quotes. Rates - column shows the maturities of forward rates in sample per currency where 1-12M implies 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. The next column (N) shows number 
of observations for each maturity, meaning there is an equivalent number of observations for each term per currency. In tradability column “forwards” marks regular forward 
market. NDF is an abbreviation of non-deliverable forward market: Offshore/foreign investors cannot move or receive the currency. NDF is thus a more restricted and frictional 
market. In the FX regime column “floating” means a fully market determined rate whereas “managed float” is either a policy of volatility reduction or a predetermined 
fluctuation band against certain currency. “CB” stands for central bank. Data retrieved from Nordea emerging markets fact book 2013 and central banks’ websites.  
 
  
Floating Price and financial stability central goals.
Forwards Inflation in the range of 3 - 6%.
Tradability
NDF
NDF
Forwards
NDF
Forwards
Managed Float
Turkey Lira TRY 1-12M 182 1999-2014
Managed Float 
vs. currency 
basket
South Korea Won KRW 1-12M 182 NDF
Forwards
1999-2014 Floating Inflation target main objective. Despite floating rate, 
active CB interventions.
South Africa Rand ZAR 1-12M 182 1999-2014 Floating
Floating Exchange rate is determined freely in the markets 
without authority intervention. 
Russia Ruble RUB 1-12M 152 2001-2014 Basket (USD 50.5. EUR 0.45), floating in corridor RUB 
32.0 - 39.0.
Mexico Peso MXN 1-12M 182 1999-2014 Forwards
1999-2014 Managed Float One single overarching objective: to establish and 
maintain rupiah stability. 
India Rupee INR 1-12M 182 1999-2014
Indonesia Rupiah IDR 1-12M 172
Market determined exchange rate but interventions 
occur in order to smooth volatility.
NDF
1999-2014 Floating Primary objective is price stability, controlled with key 
interest rates. 
Chile Peso CLP 1-12M 182 1999-2014
Czech Republic Koruna CZK 1-12M 181
Floating CB has the option to intervene. Main goals: Protect the 
value of peso and inflation. 
2000-2014 Floating CB actively intervenes in both spot and forward 
markets
Country Currency Code Rates N Period
Brazil Real BRL 1-12M 139
FX regime Central bank objectives and authority
 28 
  
The impact of these market imperfections is rather difficult to estimate before running any 
examinations because the forward biasedness is a function of both exchange rate as well as the size 
of the forward premium. Intuitively, the more frictional the markets the more biased the forward rates 
are assumed to turn out to be. Moreover, the study by Doukas and Zhang (2013) finds that the carry 
trade is more profitable, for currencies that have non-deliverable forward market against those that 
have regular onshore markets. Hence, the UIP is presumed to be more violated in the NDF currencies 
resulting in greater forward prediction errors in the long-horizon and more distant from unity beta 
estimates in the short-term.  
 
Based on the table 1 it appears that the Czech koruna, Mexican peso, South African rand and Turkish 
lira are the most functional markets. They all have floating rates, regular forward markets and the 
central/reserve banks do not actively intervene the foreign exchange markets. The next most liquid 
markets are grouped as Brazil, Chile and South Korea since they all have a NDF market, a floating 
exchange rate and, despite the floating rate, a policy for the central bank that allows active 
interventions. In this group the exchange rate is quite freely determined by investors but the central 
banks do have the authority to intervene the foreign exchange market. The least functional currencies 
in terms of most institutional control are concluded to be India, Indonesia and Russia. These 
currencies have a managed float regime in addition to the non-deliverable forward market. Managed 
float implies more frequent interventions with predetermined target values for either exchange rate 
or, in most cases, volatility.  
 
As shown above, the time period consists of observations mainly from the start of 1999 until the 
beginning of the year 2014 resulting in 15 years of data. The observations are end-of-month closing 
mid quotes for FX spot rates and forward points, retrieved from the Bloomberg Terminal. The quotes 
in Bloomberg are the quotes that the Bloomberg receives from financial institutions. In practice these 
are assumed to be well indicative of the actual rates quoted in the highly liquid interbank market as 
is argued by an industry expert, in an interview presented in the appendix F. The beginning of the 
period is relatively recent because prior to this the FX OTC forward markets have not been active for 
the majority of these currencies. Excluding Russia and Indonesia 1999 is the base year, selected with 
the criteria that in most cases it is the first operational year. In addition, this was a year, where there 
were quotes for every maturity. Mainly common time period gives flexibility and opportunities to run 
tests for commonalities in the time-series.       
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The liquidity of each currency in the OTC markets are described in table 2. Liquidity is measured 
with the average daily volume of all OTC instruments denoted in US dollars. The figures reported in 
table 2 are averages for time period 1998-2013. Given that the overall volume in the OTC marketplace 
has increased and that the below average volumes are computed from the whole time period, the 
figures in table 2 are smaller than the current liquidity of the currencies. The volume data will be 
compared to the results from the forward rate biasedness tests with the presumption that the least 
liquid currencies show most biased results for forward rates.  
  
Table 2: Currency liquidities (average daily volume in billion USD, 1998-2013) 
Table 2 reports the volume in the OTC foreign exchange for the sample currencies. The data is retrieved from the triennial 
central bank survey 2013 issued by the Bank for International Settlements22. The volume figure includes all FX 
instruments (spot, forward, swap, option) and is measured in billion US dollars. The currencies are ranked in terms of 
market volume, starting from most liquid.   
 
  
                                                 
22 http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13.htm 
Ranking Country Average Volume
1 Mexico 45
2 South Korea 33
3 South Africa 28
4 Russia 25
5 India 21
6 Turkey 21
7 Brazil 19
8 Czech Republic 7
9 Chile 5
10 Indonesia 4
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4.1.2 Variable construction and summary details 
The data is formatted suitable for the Newey-West regression in a following manner. In Bloomberg 
terminal the forward points are quoted in price interest points (pips), requiring them to be divided by 
an appropriate figure which is determined by the particular currency. These points are added to 
exchange rate from the same day to produce a forward quote. When appropriate, a natural logarithm 
is taken from both spot and forward quote. Logarithms are deployed for the regression models, 
whereas the long horizon studies utilize the actual, unmodified exchange rate data.  
 
Table 3 summarizes mean and standard deviation of realized spot rate differences as well as of 
forward premiums. The difference between standard deviations of the variables has important 
implications for the interpretation of the regression model specification. The problematic feature is 
that the standard deviation of the exchange rate is systematically far greater than the standard 
deviation of the forward premium for all currencies and maturities. A similar notion has been pointed 
out in literature and has been occasionally concluded to lead the forward premium to follow a long-
memory process with highly persistent autocorrelations (Engel, 1996). Thus, the result is worrisome 
already before running any examinations, because it seems unlikely that the changes in a highly 
volatile exchange rate could be explained by the changes in a highly stable forward premium. 
Interestingly, however, along with extended time horizon, the mean values for forward premiums 
start to achieve the values of mean change in exchange rate. Such significant mean values for the 
interest rate differential are concurring with the hypothesis 4 which presumed that in the emerging 
market currencies, the forward rates will become upwards biased predictors, when the maturity is 
extended sufficiently given that the premiums are assumed to become considerable, and the overall 
trend in the exchange rate to be in decline.  
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Table 3: Regression variable mean values and standard deviations 
Table 3 describes the variables used in the Fama regressions, at intervals of 1- and 12-months. Maturities of 3- and 6-
months are left out for the sake of clarity. The variables are logarithmic conversions of the change in spot rate (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) 
and the forward premium (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡). The figures reported below are the mean and standard deviation for all currencies. 
The values appear small given the applied natural logarithm, the underlying rates and points are on a different scale.   
 
 
The aforementioned finding of highly stabile forward premium and volatile spot rate is illustrated, in 
addition, graphically below in figure 3. Figure 3 depicts the logarithmic spot rate difference and 
forward premium for two currencies and terms, i.e. 1-month interval for Czech koruna and 6-month 
interval for Mexican peso. These were picked purely for illustrative purposes to display the difference 
in the magnitude of the variances of these variables. It can be observed that the CZK 1-month spot 
rate variable moves aggressively around zero while the changes for the forward premium are almost 
not visible. When the interval is extended, and the currency is substituted to MXN, the spot changes 
are still considerably larger in magnitude. Next the impact of the described volatility issue is discussed 
in terms of time-series properties of the variables. Baillie and Cho (2014) suggest that this divergence 
in variable variances stipulates the Fama regression to be unbalanced if the forward premium, as a 
consequence, has a long memory process. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable BRL CLP CZK INR IDR MXN RUB ZAR KRW TRY
St+1M - St 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.030 0.003 -0.001 0.010
St+12M - St 0.270 0.000 -0.040 0.023 0.024 0.014 0.024 0.035 -0.006 0.109
St+1M - St 0.051 0.035 0.037 0.022 0.042 0.029 0.036 0.048 0.033 0.051
St+12M - St 0.430 0.116 0.122 0.087 0.126 0.181 0.074 0.180 0.116 0.228
Ft
1M
 - St 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.018
Ft
12M
 - St 0.084 0.023 -0.001 0.035 0.068 0.038 0.051 0.059 0.007 0.202
Ft
1M
 - St 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.016
Ft
12M
 - St 0.033 0.019 0.013 0.021 0.031 0.015 0.009 0.021 0.012 0.173
Mean
St Dev
Mean
St Dev
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Figure 3: Variable volatilities illustrated graphically 
Figure 3 shows historical values of the variables (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) and (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡), where i=1-month and 6-months and t=1/1999-
1/2014 for the currencies Czech koruna and Mexican peso. The Czech koruna is measured on one month interval, thus 
the variables below are (𝑠𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑡) denoted with CZKspot1m and (𝑓𝑡
1 − 𝑠𝑡) denoted with CZKfwd1m. The Mexican peso 
is measured with the interval of 6-months, i.e. the variables are mathematically (𝑠𝑡+6 − 𝑠𝑡) and (𝑓𝑡
6 − 𝑠𝑡). These two 
periods and currencies are selected purely for illustrative purposes: To show that the variance of the spot rate is clearly 
greater than that of the interest rate differential. The changes range roughly between -2 to 4 given the logarithmic 
conversion. January 2008 is marked on the x-axis to show the upcoming volatility jump.  
 
Given the documented persistent autocorrelations in forward premium (Baillie & Bollerslev, 2000), 
the stationarity properties of the variables becomes of increased intrigue. However, the issue is that a 
regular test for unit root may lead to a false acceptation or rejection of the null hypothesis (Sakoulis, 
Zivot and Choi, 2010). Nevertheless, a test for unit root is conducted below but it is not given a 
substantial consideration. The test or unit root is carried out with a modified Dickey-Fuller test with 
a generalized least squares transformation (DF-GLS test). The test gives three suggestions for the 
optimal amount of lag operators out of which the Ng-Perron statistic is preferred, in accordance with 
Becketti (2013). The variables are examined for the maturities of 1-month and 12-months only, 
because this is concluded to be sufficient in terms of producing adequate information about the 
robustness of the regressions.  
 
The results from the DG-GLS test are reported in table 4. Before running the actual tests, the variables 
were first depicted graphically to investigate a potential trend which needs to be included in the DF-
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GLS equation if so desired. The 12-month premium in particular indicated such characteristics, which 
was accounted for, but did not result in significant changes in estimates. The spot rate variables were 
quite unanimously rejecting the unit root which is in line with the existing evidence (Engel, 1996). 
The forward premium, on the other hand, was more challenging to interpret. Some of the estimates 
changed with the inclusion of trend-term and many were not conclusive throughout the model that 
incorporated approximately 1-13 lag terms overall. The unit root properties were very miscellaneous 
because the null of unit root was particularly accepted for rearmost lag terms (10+). Yet, based on the 
Ng-Perron optimal lag operator, the final conclusions were made: half of the ten premiums at 1-month 
level rejected a unit root, including South Africa, Indonesia and Russia. Whereas for the 12-month 
interval only two currencies managed to reject the null of unit root. The finding of varying unit root 
properties for the forward premium is common in the literature likewise (Engel, 1996). 
 
Table 4: DF-GLS test for unit root 
Table 4 summarizes the unit root properties of logarithmically converted difference in exchange rate (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) and the 
forward premium (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) for the maturities of 1-month and 12-months . The test carried out is the DF-GLS i.e. Dickey-
Fuller test for unit root that undergoes a GLS transformation prior the estimation of Dickey-Fuller regression. The tests 
for exchange rate variables have a notrend-specification because the graphical inspection indicated it is stationary around 
a mean instead of a linear trend. Forward premium did not denote similar characteristics, hence it was examined with the 
inclusion of trend term, which is a default option in the DF-GLS test. I(0) refers to stationary time-series and I(1) to 
stationary at first difference. The results should not be interpreted with precise scrutiny given the literature findings that 
the forward premium cannot be classified as a process with a constant order of integration. Furthermore, most 
examinations did not reject or accept the null hypothesis of unit root unanimously for all lag lengths.  
 
 
1M 12M 1M 12M
Brazil I(0) I(0) I(0) I(I)
Chile I(0) I(0) I(1) I(I)
Czech Republic I(0) I(0) I(0) I(I)
India I(0) I(0) I(1) I(I)
Indonesia I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Mexico I(0) I(0) I(1) I(I)
Russia I(0) I(0) I(0) I(I)
South Africa I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
South Korea I(0) I(0) I(1) I(I)
Turkey I(0) I(0) I(1) I(I)
Exchange rate Forward PremiumCountry
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Per se, normally the finding of unit root in forward premium would imply that the series is non-
stationary and regressing with a stationary spot rate make the Fama regression unbalanced (Baillie 
and Bollerslev, 2000). Furthermore, the interpretation is that the slope or beta estimates become 
inconsistent (Engel, 1996). This line of deduction is not encouraged for the following reasons: 
Historically unit root tests have produced highly variable results, the DF-GLS test presented in table 
4 produced slightly inconclusive results and, finally, the forward premium has documented to have 
structural breaks (Engel, 1996; Baillie and Cho, 2014). Especially the latter, the structural breaks, is 
a strong argument against hasting into interpretations. Baillie and Cho (2014) conclude that forward 
premium cannot be classified as process with a constant order of integration, such as a unit root, 
because it actually evolves through time. Moreover, as considered in the literature review, Sakoulis, 
Zivot and Choi (2010) find that the standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests produces biased results 
when the structural breaks are not accounted for. They conclude that the unbiased forward rate 
hypothesis should not be rejected based on an ADF test and thus it is rejected in this research either.  
 
Most of the findings above are troublesome from a regression perspective but good news for the latter 
section of this study which is to graphically depict and measure the forward rate bias in exchange rate 
terms. Both the considerable difference in variable standard deviations and the potential for unit root 
in the forward premium are challenging for the regression specification. As the other variable is 
remarkably volatile while the other experiences changes on a much smaller scale, it can be difficult 
to find a reasonably well fitting model. Even if the regression would produce a statistically significant 
slope estimate, how valid can it be because the scale of the results will probably be narrow, i.e. the 
horizontal axis consisting of different values of the forward premium is assumed to turn out to have 
a very thin range of values. From the perspective of graphical inspection of distant horizon forward 
rate prediction error, the low volatility of the forward premium is a rather desired property. Steady 
behavior in conjunction with large values presumably enable a fruitful graphical analysis.  
 
In the next section of this research, the methodology, used for the sample described above, will be 
presented and commented. Firstly the short-term measurement of uncovered interest rate parity is 
carried out using a Newey-West regression. Secondly the long-term unbiasedness test is executed by 
plotting the forward rate prediction error in exchange rate terms on the sample time line. The 
methodology section is followed by the presentation of results and an analysis of findings linking 
them to existing literature as well as the notions presented in this data subchapter, ranging from the 
statistical properties of the forward premium to the characteristics of each foreign exchange market.  
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4.2 Methodology  
The unbiased forward rate hypothesis is tested in two distinct phases similar to the two sets of 
hypotheses. The short horizon test is conducted with a Fama regression model that uses Newey-West 
(N-W) standard errors similarly to previous articles deploying an overlapping sample. The maturities 
of the regression variables are 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months. Before examining the distant horizon 
unbiasedness, the robustness of the Newey-West regression findings is confirmed by running rolling 
regressions with a one month interval. Given the renowned issues with the Fama model as well as the 
arguably enhanced possibilities for discussion, the long-term examination is carried out by a graphical 
inspection of the forward bias. The distant horizon forward rates of primary focus are for one and five 
year maturities.  
4.2.1 Newey-West regression specification 
The regression is conducted is the previously mentioned Fama (1984) regression for all forward 
maturities and currencies. The model in this research applies the actual forward premium as the 
explanatory variable instead of the interest rate differential which is oftentimes used in corresponding 
studies. The forward rates are OTC market quotes retrieved from the Bloomberg terminal. The 
regression model is as follows:  
 
 𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡+𝑖 (1) 
 
Where (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) is the difference between spot exchange rate at time t and t+i, where i is the 
maturity of the forward contract. (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) is the forward premium or the interest rate differential of 
an i maturity forward at time t. 𝛽 tells whether or not the latter i.e. forward premium or discount has 
explanatory power over the changes in a foreign exchange rate. Maturities used are common for OTC 
currency derivatives and they are 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months (i). If the forward rate unbiasedness 
hypothesis holds, as described in hypothesis 1, (𝛽 = 1) and (𝑎 = 0) with a statistical significance.  
4.2.2 Data overlap discussed 
When regressing annual forward rates on a monthly basis a moving average error process is created, 
which is a deliberate choice to maximize the number of observations and consequently the amount of 
information. Data overlap is addressed using Newey-West (1987) heteroskedastic and autocorrelation 
consistent (HAC) standard errors. It is a method for calculating a positive semidefinite covariance 
matrix that is consistent in the presence of unknown forms of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
(Smith and McAleer, 1994). Also comparable academic articles frequently apply the N-W regression, 
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whether they deploy the standard monthly horizon or extended maturities (see e.g., Snaith, Coakley 
and Kellard, 2013; Beber, Breedon and Buraschi, 2010; Backus, Foresi and Telmer, 2001). Snaith, 
Coakley and Kellard (2013) further argue that an alternative form of econometric specification, such 
as vector autoregression (VAR), is inadequate to test the time horizon effect because it imposes a 
specific model on the system under consideration which, if it is incorrectly constructed, makes result 
interpretation of long-run forecasts unclear. Hence, the Newey-West regression model is preferred as 
the methodology in the first phase of this research. However, extending the interval further appears 
problematic from the regression perspective. Snaith, Coakley and Kellard (2013) argue that the N-W 
method is not a comprehensive response to the data overlap issue. They suggest that in addition a 
pseudo data forming process of t-statistics would be required. Given the assumption that the data 
overlap would become excessive, the horizon of five years is measured with the forward prediction 
error instead of the Fama regression. Along with the simplified approach the additional objectives 
will be achieved as will be discussed subsequently in this chapter.  
4.2.3 Monthly rolling regression estimation 
To test whether the beta parameters estimated with the model (1) for emerging economies are 
consistent through time, the N-W regression is run rolling with a monthly interval. A strand of 
literature claim that the beta is highly time-dependent and that the negative beta estimates are mainly 
a product of the 1980s and the 1990s subsamples (Lothian and Wu, 2011; Baillie and Bollerslev, 
2001). The N-W regression (1) is run monthly rolling for a five year window resulting in 123 rolling 
regressions for each country producing 123 chronological beta parameter estimates. In the first stage 
of regressions there were 182 observations per model, and by using monthly observations in the 
rolling procedure, this leaves the final five years or 60 months out. The only maturity used is the one 
month maturity for both forward premium and spot differential to provide a non-overlapping sample 
and consequently robust results.  
 
The moving beta estimation also seeks for structural breaks which have been found to exist in the 
forward premiums of major currencies (Baille and Cho, 2014). A rolling regression is not perhaps the 
optimal method for detecting time-series breaks in the mean of the forward premium but it provides 
comprehensible output that is facile to compare to the beta estimates from the N-W regressions. 
Furthermore, an exhaustive analysis of structural breaks is slightly out of the focus of this study. The 
more elaborate methods to detect such breaks in mean values include a multiple mean structural break 
models of Bai and Perron (1998 & 2003) used both by Sakoulis, Zivot and Choi (2010) and Baille 
and Cho (2014). Nevertheless, the moving estimation gives information on whether the Fama 
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regression results are robust throughout the sample, or are they only artifacts of some sub-period of 
the overall sample. Moreover, to graphically plot the moving regressions on the time line is potentially 
informative for the next section of this study; the study of distant horizon forward rate bias which 
also varies through time.  
4.2.4 Forward prediction error for one and five year maturities 
Several challenges regarding the Fama regression model as well as possibilities for alternative tests 
were pointed out the data and methods chapter. Even though the regression uses N-W standard errors, 
the comparably low volatility of the forward premium is an issue for the model specification. It is 
difficult to find or even presume to find a good model fit with such discrepancy in variable standard 
deviations. However, the steady nature of the forward premium provides productive grounds for 
examining the forward bias graphically. Furthermore, the emerging market currency unique high 
interest rate differentials were confirmed in the data subchapter, which establishes interest towards 
testing the effect of extending the time period further. 
 
The distant time horizon effect is examined by plotting the forward prediction error or bias in 
exchange rate terms (2). The maturities presented are only one and five years to allow for a more 
detailed discussion.   
 
𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖 (2) 
 
The forward rate forecast error (2) is the difference between a forward rate (𝑓𝑡
𝑖) and the future spot 
rate (𝑠𝑡+𝑖) that the forward rate intended to forecast. The definition is directly deduced from the Fama 
regression, as was demonstrated in the hypothesis section. The regression model (1) explains the 
relationship between the difference in spot rate (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) and the forward premium (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡). If the 
null hypothesis is confirmed, the slope coefficient equals one and thus on average, the variables have 
values in a similar magnitude (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡 ≈ 𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡). Hence, the unbiasedness requires that on average 
(𝑠𝑡+𝑖 ≈ 𝑓𝑡
𝑖)23.  The forward rate prediction error is a measure of forward rate bias, if the values of the 
forecast error are positive the forward rate for that maturity is an upwards biased predictor and vice 
versa.  
 
                                                 
23 For reference, the original Fama regression took the form (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 (𝑓𝑡
𝑖) + 𝜀𝑡+1), and was afterwards modified 
to the applied from to account for the first difference stationary spot rate.  
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I argue that the method of graphical inspection is strong because it neglects any assumption of causal 
relationship, in that changes in forward premium should result in similar magnitude changes in the 
spot rate. Such assumption is quite restrictive for the UIP because the forward premium is known to 
have a remarkably low variance in relation to the variance in spot rate. Thus it is even ex-ante unlikely 
to find a high coefficient of determination in a regression model, which would require that the 
variance in forward premium would explain a significant proportion of the variance in spot rate. 
Moreover, the potential distorting impact of structural breaks on the regression model may be 
neglected. The prediction error simply measures the biasedness with no intention to assume that any 
changes in spot rate would be actually caused or explained by the forward premium.  
 
The avoidance of econometric issues is not yet a sufficient rationale to examine the forward bias as a 
simple difference between the forward rate and future exchange rate. The augmenting factor enabling 
such analysis is the distinct size of the forward premium in the emerging currency markets. Together 
with the steady behaviour of the forward premium, the method of graphical depiction becomes 
feasible and preferable. In particular, when extending the time horizon from one to five years, there 
is a high possibility that the results are graphically visible and interpretable. As was pointed out in 
the data chapter in table 3, already on the one year interval the average size of the forward premium 
appears considerable. Thus, at a five year interval, in conjunction with the presumed emerging market 
exchange rate decline, the forward prediction errors are expected to become consistently positive and 
visible. 
4.2.5 The construction of the five year forward rates  
There is one distinct issue with the test of the long-term uncovered interest rate parity. The five year 
forward rates used as variables are not actual OTC quotes of five year forward rates because data for 
such rates is scarcely available. Hence, the five year forward rates are synthetic or proxy in nature 
and they are constructed from one year forward points (forward premiums). The synthetic five year 
forward premiums are constructed by adding up a chronological sequence of one year forward 
premiums that effectively cover the period of five years, i.e. the maturity of the five year forward rate 
that is intended to approximate. Thus, the consequent cumulative annual forward points create a 
chronologically seamless proxy of a five year forward premium. Table 5 illustrates the construction 
of the five year forward rates.   
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Table 5: The construction of five year forward rates 
Table 5 demonstrates the method for approximating the five year forward rates, presented in equation (3), using Brazilian 
real against US dollar exchange rate and forward data. It is the sum of the exchange rate at t=0 and five subsequent one 
year forward premiums. The forward premiums below are divided by 10 00 given the currency conventions. The 
illustration highlighted takes the spot rate at t=2008 and the one year premiums annually henceforth. The structure of the 
constructed quote covers the same period as an actual five year forward rate would have covered, which is the main 
criteria for selecting the method of computing cumulative sequential forward premiums. The synthetic five year rate 
below matures in 2013, five years from the initiation. Each five year rate is estimated five years ahead for each month.  
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
t 0 1 2 3 4 5
USD/BRL 2.1411 2.0569 1.8793 1.7143 1.895 2.3228
1y Premium 1485 1105 1178 1460 1454 1748
1y Forward 2.2896 2.1674 1.9971 1.8603 2.0404 2.4976
5y Forward 2.8093
 
An alternative method of approximation would have been e.g. to multiply the one year forward 
premium by five (above 1485 or 0.1485). However, unlike the subsequent premiums, the simple 
multiplication is not indicative of the risk present during the lifetime of the five year forward contract. 
The foremost benefit of the above described method off adding up cumulative annual premiums is 
that those premiums cover the exact same time period as the five year forward rate would have 
covered. Both an actual and the synthetic five year forward described above have the same, and only 
one, spot exchange rate to which the forward premiums are added (e.g. in table it is 2.1411). A 
question that may arise is that what is the relationship between the actual five year premium, traded 
on the OTC market, and the synthetic five year premium computed above? According to an industry 
expert, as presented in appendix F, the actual OTC five year forwards often carry an additional 
premium given they introduce additional accounting requirements for the financial institutions. 
Therefore, the deployed proxy is a prudent one.  
 
What is beneficial about adding up the subsequent annual premiums is that such strategy is plausible 
to execute in the OTC foreign exchange market, effectively, to create a five year forward. Thus, the 
selected method of computing the cumulative premiums is not only an efficient proxy for a five year 
forward rate for the purposes of the empirical objectives of this study, it is also a completely plausible 
method of constructing a synthetic five year forward rate in the actual OTC foreign exchange market. 
Appendix B demonstrates the required actions to construct the artificial five year forward contract. 
The procedures are relatively standard for entities operating in the OTC foreign exchange market, 
and the aim is simply to remove the impact of the evolving exchange rate during the five year period.   
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 𝑓𝑡
5 = 𝑠𝑡 + 𝑓𝑝𝑡
1 + 𝑓𝑝𝑡+1
1 + 𝑓𝑝𝑡+2
1 + 𝑓𝑝𝑡+3
1 + 𝑓𝑝𝑡+4
1  (3) 
 
Equation (3) demonstrates how a five year forward rate is mathematically constructed. In the 
equation, t stands for time in years and the superscript stands for the maturity of the forward rate 
which equals one year in each case. Fp is used to denote forward points, or forward premium. The 
five year proxy is a sum of the exchange rate at time t=0 and five subsequent one year forward points 
(t=0, 1, 2, 3, 4), added annually after the extraction of the spot rate. When the five one year points are 
added together, a forward covering a time period of five years is constructed. Thus the forward 
premiums create a seamless time line, equal to the maturity of an actual five year forward.  
4.2.6 The forward forecast error and the impact on returns from hedging 
The final benefit of the prediction error approach is that it can be utilized to estimate hedging 
performance. There is no separate methodology for the examination of hedging performance. Instead 
the returns for forwards analysed in conjunction with the findings from the long-term forecast errors 
given those are the exact same figures. This subchapter intends to authenticate and demonstrate the 
interconnectedness of a forward return and the prediction error.  
 
All of the illustrations in this section are based on somewhat subjective assumptions on how MNCs 
manage their foreign exchange risk. The underlying logic is that a company knows with certainty that 
a cash flow, whether it is inflow or outflow, will occur on a specific date in the future. The definition 
of certainty over a future cash flow is of course a matter of taste but for the purposes of this 
demonstrative paragraph it is taken as given. If the entity in question desires the hedge the cash flow 
it will use a forward contract with the exact same maturity as the date of the event to lock in the 
exchange rate. If the cash flow denoted in foreign currency is outflow, the forward is done to buy the 
equal foreign currency amount from the OTC market. Thus, the foreign exchange risk caused by the 
introduction of a new foreign currency denominated cash flow is offset with an equal foreign currency 
denominated cash flow in the OTC market. The following examples use US dollar denominated cash 
flows to signify foreign currency denominated cash flow (for the MNC) because it is more illustrative, 
even though the foreign currency for many advanced economy based multinational companies can be 
considered to be the emerging market currency instead.  
 
The forward prediction error is a direct measure of yield on an OTC forward contract, as established 
in the interview of Mikko Vainikka, the FX risk manager of Metso Corporation in appendix F. In the 
academic field, a similar definition of return can be found in carry trade studies (see e.g., Menkhoff, 
 41 
  
Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf, 2012; Doukas and Zhang, 2013). The connection to carry trade is 
that, effectively, the profit measure (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) can be perceived as the difference between two 
alternatives; to hedge with a forward rate or speculate with the future exchange rate. Either the 
beforehand known cash flow is committed to with a forward rate (hedge) or the future cash flow will 
be determined by the yet unknown future exchange rate (speculate). Thus the comparison is made to 
the reference point of no forward contract what so ever. What is feasible about the approach is that 
the future exchange rate is a plausible alternative for the forward rate. For instance, if a corporation 
needs to buy 1 million US dollars against Brazilian real (BRL) one month from now, it can either 
lock in the exchange rate with a one month forward contract or, wait for the one month to pass and 
then buy the dollars in the spot exchange market, with the future exchange rate.  
 
Table 6 illustrates the relation between the forward bias (2) and the profitability of hedging (of 
forward contract). The presented figures will not be computed in any subsequent part of this thesis. 
The sole purpose is to demonstrate the interconnectedness between the employed methodology as 
well as practical return on foreign exchange hedging.  
Table 6: The forward return and prediction error 
Table 6 illustrates the connection between the forward rate bias or prediction error presented in equation (2), and the 
return of a forward contract. The intention is only to demonstrate the “Hedge return” as the implication of forward bias 
on hedging practices because the logic is used in the subsequent discussion of distant time horizon results. The main idea 
is that the return of a forward, or a hedge, is defined in comparison to the alternative of not having hedged at all which 
implies using the exchange rate at the future point of time. The calculation below illustrates the cash flow effect of a 
forward selling one million US dollars by the entity in question to a counterparty, either with a forward or with the future 
exchange rate. Against the one million US dollars used as an example, Brazilian reals are received either according to the 
future spot exchange rate (2.0569) or according to the one year forward rate (2.2896) committed to one year before the 
cash flow.  
 
2008 2009 2010
t 0 1 2
USD/BRL 2.1411 2.0569 1.8793
1-year Forward 2.2896 2.1674 1.9971
Forward bias 0.2327 0.2881
 =Hedge return
The cash flow effect
USD outflow (spot/forward) -$1 000 000 -$1 000 000
BRL inflow (USD/BRL) 2 056 900 1 879 300
BRL inflow (1y Forward) 2 289 604 2 167 390
Cost/profit of hedge BRL 232 704 288 090
( 𝑓𝑡
𝑖 1)
 (𝑠𝑡)
 ( 𝑓𝑡
1−𝑠𝑡+1) =
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Table 6 demonstrates how in an example situation the cash flows would realize in relation to the 
forward bias. As can be seen, the forward forecast error is directly usable as a profit figure if the 
presented logic is accepted: The profit of a forward contract can be defined as the difference to the 
alternative of transacting in the spot foreign exchange market in the future. The example in table 6 
demonstrates cash flow effect of a forward contract that has a nominal (principal) of paying 1 million 
US dollars for a counterparty in the OTC market and receiving Brazilian reals in exchange. The 
alternative to this forward contract is to wait for the one year to pass (2008-2009) and then pay 1 
million dollars and receive Brazilian reals according to the future market situation (2009).  
 
The forward prediction error is also feasible to the opposite type of foreign exchange rate risk. If the 
entity in question is instead interested in committing to a forward rate with which it receives US 
dollars and pays with Brazilian reals, the return is exactly the inverse of the prediction error. The 
return framework applies to Brazilian real denominated amounts as well. It is not similarly a direct 
profit figure but is indicative of the size of the profit or loss. Table 7 illustrates the interpretation of 
the forward prediction error in different situations. As can be seen, because in each foreign exchange 
trade, whether its spot or forward transaction, there are always two currencies involved. Thus there 
is always a position effect in two currencies from making one transaction. Furthermore, the 
implication is that the profit figures are not, as mentioned, directly applicable to underlying amounts 
in both currencies of the exchange rate. The profit or loss from a forward contract, defined as the 
prediction error, is however indicative of the size of the profit or loss for the other currency (emerging 
market currency) denominated forward contracts as well.  
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Table 7: The connection between profitability, prediction error and hypotheses 
Table 7 illustrates what is the connection between the yield of a forward, prediction error and the hypotheses set from 
hedging perspective. The highlighted boxes are what the hypothesis 4 expects to find: the forward bias at distant maturity 
is consistently positive, which implies that committing to a forward that is used to agree to sell EM currency and buy 
USD, is unprofitable. When analyzed from hedging perspective there is always an underlying cash flow commitment that 
is hedged with the forward. For a multinational company, the underlying commitment can be e.g. a receivable or payable 
which the company has decided to hedge beforehand. In the below example, the forward contract is made to sell EM 
currency and buy USD, for an exposure of -1m USD (say the company has a 1mUSD payable or other outflow occurring 
in the future). Thus, the impact of the action of committing to the forward contract has the foreign exchange position 
effect of going short in EM currency and going long in USD. An analogy to carry trade can be made that it is assumed to 
be profitable in the long-term as well.  
 
 
Even though it is not analysed subsequently in this thesis, the impact on cash flows of different 
alternatives of hedging or not to hedge may well be substantial, resulting in an impact on the operating 
performance of multinational companies. The theoretical framework applied for distant horizons, the 
measurement of forward forecast error, is interested in producing recommendations that are based on 
a consistent profitability of a certain maturity forward instead of modelling exact cash flows in 
different scenarios. As explained in the hypothesis section, one of the research questions is; does the 
forward bias grow, when the maturity is extended from one to five years, to such scale that the forward 
rate becomes consistently upwards biased predictor of future exchange rate. Such finding would 
imply hedges in-loss similarly as in the table 7 above. In addition to the graphical examination of 
forward forecast errors at distant maturities, the unbiased forward rate hypothesis is tested with the 
conventional Fama regression model in the following results section.   
BID (LHS) ASK (RHS)
Positive forward bias  Profitable: a direct profit figure In-loss: a direct profit figure USD 
Positive forward bias  Profitable: not exact return In-loss: not exact return Emerging
Negative forward bias In-loss: a direct profit figure  Profitable: a direct profit figure USD
Negative forward bias In-loss: not exact return  Profitable: not exact return Emerging
$1 000 000 -$1 000 000
-$1 000 000 $1 000 000
Long in EM currency, short in USD Short in EM currency, long in USD
The position effect of committing  to a 
forward rate 
FX forward position effect (in cash 
flow)
Buy emerging market currency,        
sell US dollars
Sell emerging market currency,           
buy US dollars
Nominal amount 
denominted in
OTC forward agreed to: 
Underlying FX position - Cash flow 
commitment (e.g. receivable/payable)
 ( 𝑓𝑡
𝑖−𝑠𝑡+1)>0
 ( 𝑓𝑡
𝑖−𝑠𝑡+1)>0
 ( 𝑓𝑡
𝑖−𝑠𝑡+1)<0
 ( 𝑓𝑡
𝑖−𝑠𝑡+1)<0
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5 Results 
In this section, the results from the previously illustrated models and data set are presented and 
discussed in correspondence to the findings from existing literature. Forward bias is first estimated 
for different term forward contracts with a regression using Newey-West robust standard errors, 
followed by rolling beta estimates on a monthly interval. The unbiased forward rate and time horizon 
for one and five year maturities is examined by plotting the prediction errors i.e. the forward bias in 
exchange rate terms. It is found that in the emerging economies, the unbiased forward rate hypothesis 
or uncovered interest parity is rejected, similarly to existing literature covering the advanced 
economies. The time horizon effect, however, is the reversal to the more established currencies as the 
forward bias escalates consistently along with extended maturity. The magnitude of the bias is found 
to increase with a rapid pace to the extent that already at a five year horizon, in most cases, the forward 
rate is a systematically upwards biased predictor of the future spot rate, implying forwards maturing 
in-loss or profit throughout the sample, depending on which currency the entity in question is buying 
and which selling with the forward contract (US dollar or EM currency).  
5.1 Newey-West regression  
The results from the Fama regression using Newey-West robust standard errors for all currencies and 
time horizons of 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months are presented in table 8. For most currencies and maturities, 
the unbiased forward rate hypothesis is rejected in emerging economies in accordance with the 
existing evidence. Inspecting the one month estimates, and only the statistically significant values, 
shows that the beta coefficients are mostly negative, with the exception of Russian ruble. The range 
of significant negative beta estimates ranges from (−0.8 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ −4.0) which can be concluded to be 
in similar magnitude as what has been found in previous literature for both emerging and advanced 
economies. In the literature review, the range of consensus beta estimates were concluded to be 
similarly wide because the estimates have historically varied substantially. Frankel and Poonawala 
(2010) suggest an average (𝛽 = −4) for advanced economies, while the survey by Froot and Thaler 
(1990) compute an average estimate of (𝛽 = -0.88) over 75 studies. Also the short-term betas in 
Lothian and Wu’s (2011) study are approximately at (𝛽 = -0.2) for the subsample of post Bretton 
Woods era. Thus, in the literature review it was concluded that all slope estimates in range of (−0.5 ≤
𝛽 ≤ −4) are in line with the existing evidence using short-term data. 
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Table 8: Fama regression with Newey-West standard errors for 1-, 3-, 6- and 12-months 
Results from the Fama regression model, (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡+𝑖), are presented below. (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) is the difference between an exchange rate (spot rate) at time t and 
i period from t, in other words, the spot rate upon the maturity of the forward subtracted by the spot rate upon the initiation of the forward contract. (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) is the forward 
premium or the interest rate differential for i maturity forward entered at time t. 𝛽 is the slope coefficient estimate, and *, **, *** stand for 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively. SE(β) is the Newey-West robust standard error and R2 is the coefficient of determination indicating the proportion of variance in the change of spot rate  that is 
explained by the variance of the forward premium in question. The intercept, 𝛼 values were not close to the desired zero value, thus and given the literature conventions, the 
alpha estimates are not redundantly presented here. Example alphas and fitted values are presented in appendix G.  
 
 
β SE(β) R2 β SE(β) R2 β SE(β) R2 β SE(β) R2
Brazil 0.22 0.62 0.00 -0.39* 0.23 0.01 0.14 1.05 0.00 -0.49 0.88 0.01
Chile 1.47 0.91 0.01 2.10*** 0.70 0.04 2.50*** 0.63 0.09 2.61*** 0.59 0.18
Czech Republic -0.18 1.97 0.00 0.09 1.38 0.00 0.45 2.09 0.00 1.36 2.03 0.02
India 0.53 0.54 0.00 1.24** 0.52 0.03 1.34** 0.67 0.06 1.31* 0.67 0.08
Indonesia -2.04*** 0.64 0.04 -2.29*** 0.56 0.10 -2.59*** 0.59 0.23 -2.32*** 0.45 0.36
Mexico -0.76** 0.36 0.01 -0.50* 0.3 0.01 -0.41 0.25 0.01 -0.19 0.23 0.01
Russia 1.61*** 0.27 0.17 1.13*** 0.33 0.13 0.18 0.28 0.00 -0.59 0.36 0.00
South Africa -4.03*** 1.35 0.03 -4.28** 1.52 0.09 -4.51** 1.38 0.15 -4.76*** 1.34 0.31
South Korea 0.23 1.47 0.00 -0.97 0.96 0.01 -0.55 1.49 0.00 -1.12 1.96 0.02
Turkey 0.42* 0.22 0.02 0.49** 0.24 0.05 0.35 0.23 0.04 0.30 0.21 0.05
1M 3M 6M 12M
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On the one month interval, if all the coefficients were included in the analysis, including the 
statistically insignificant ones, the conclusions would be different. Most of the betas that do not attain 
significance are positive. The exact coefficient estimates are similar to those found by Frankel and 
Poonwala (2010), who carry out a comparison between advanced and emerging economies for a one 
month maturity. The interpretation is, however, different. Frankel and Poonwala (2010) calculate an 
average of all beta estimates, including the insignificant ones, to arrive at a conclusion that the forward 
premium anomaly is less severe in the emerging markets. I argue that only the estimates attaining 
statistical significance should be acknowledged given the already low goodness of fit of the model 
indicated by the low R-squared values. Thus, in this research, the uncovered interest rate parity using 
the standard horizon of one month is rejected with similar values as is rejected historically for the 
advanced economies.  
 
The extension of time horizon brings forth the most interesting and the most dissenting results in 
comparison to the academic literature. There is a moderate consensus in the literature that the 
uncovered interest rate parity works better when the time period is extended from the standard of one 
month. Both Lothian and Wu (2011) and Snaith, Coakley and Kellard (2013) as well as Chinn (2006) 
find that beta coefficient estimates of advanced currencies approach unity when the maturity is 
lengthened. Snaith, Coakley and Kellard (2013) find that the unity is reached generally at a three 
years interval. Regardless of the exact maturity when the unity is reached, the fundamental 
relationship proposed is that the UIP performs systematically better with longer horizons. The 
regression output in table 8 suggests a completely reversal time period effect in the emerging 
economies. When the time period is extended from one to twelve months, most of the betas that attain 
statistical significance (Chile, Indonesia and South Africa), become increasingly different from the 
desired value of one along with increased maturity. Thus, the forward bias becomes systematically 
greater along with the horizon. The coefficient for Chilean peso is positive but nevertheless the beta 
grows further away from the unity value which implies an increase of forward biasedness similarly 
to betas becoming more negative. The only outlier country is Russia which sporadically attains near 
unity beta estimates. Those estimates are, however, inconsistent through time and potentially highly 
affected by the strict managed float regime applied by the country’s central bank.   
 
The findings in this paper are not the first evidence in the literature against the finding of decrease in 
forward bias along with time horizon. Bekaert, Wei and Yuhang (2007) find the uncovered interest 
parity to hold well for certain currencies regardless of the time horizon. Thus, implying that the UIP 
functions well for some of the sample exchange rates for every time horizon but that there is no 
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difference between the beta estimates for different maturities within each currency. The 
aforementioned finding of this research is thus completely contradicting to the proposed point of view 
of Bekaert, Wei and Yuhang (2007). The unbiased forward rate hypothesis in emerging economies is 
found to alter as a function of maturity, with a systematic tendency of the forward bias to grow along 
with extended time horizon.  
 
The result of increasing forward bias along with extended maturity in the emerging economies is 
intuitively appealing but the Fama regression appears to be a poorly fitting model. The R-squared 
ratio reported in the third column of each forward maturity shows low values as anticipated: On 
average the R-squared ratios are around 3% for shorter maturities. The interpretation is that the model 
explains only a minor proportion of changes in exchange rate suggesting, moreover, that the model 
employed is not well fitting to describe the underlying dynamics. Surprisingly, the coefficient of 
determination enhances to as high as 31% and 36% for Indonesia and South Africa for 12-month 
variables. Thus, it appears that the generally exercised short horizon examinations of uncovered 
interest rate parity are less feasible than the time horizon studies. Furthermore, appendix G illustrates 
this argument by presenting the fitted lines for the Indonesian rupiah with one and twelve months 
maturities. The issue with the standard one month models appears to be exactly what was presumed 
in the data and literature sections; the significantly low variance of the forward premium in 
comparison to the variance of the exchange rate. However, when the maturity is extended 12-months 
the variance of the forward premium increases comparably more, which results in better model fit 
measured by the R-squared and a smaller discrepancy in the scales of the explained and explanatory 
variables. The increase in goodness of fit along with time period, however, is substantial only for the 
South African rand and Indonesian rupiah.   
 
The results from the Newey-West regression contributed to the academic literature but the regression 
model does not come without shortcomings. For the standard interval of one month, the forward 
premium anomaly is concluded to exist in the emerging economies in a similar fashion as in the 
advanced economies. The time horizon effect in the emerging economies is found to be completely 
reversal to what has been found in the advanced economies. The forward rate bias escalates along 
with extended maturity implying increased uncovered interest rate parity failure with the longer 
maturities. Next, the time period consistency of the N-W regression beta coefficient estimates is 
checked with the rolling regression model. In addition, breaks in the forward premium are intended 
to be detected.  
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5.2 Time-varying beta estimate: rolling regressions 
To test whether the beta estimates are consistent through time as well as to detect breaks in the mean 
of the one month forward premium, rolling regressions are carried out. The rationale stems from the 
existing literature where it has been noted that the beta estimates vary substantially through time 
(Lothian and Wu, 2011; Baillie and Bollerslev, 2001). Baillie and Cho (2014) further propose that, 
given the existence of the multiple breaks, the Fama model is only valid for specific time intervals 
within sample data sets. The outcome of rolling regressions is not only compared to the findings from 
the initial Newey-West regression but, in addition, the time varying characteristics of the forward 
premium anomaly will be referred to in the subsequent discussion of distant horizon forward rate 
biasedness which is similarly plotted on the sample time line.  
 
Figure 4 reports the results of the rolling regressions for all sample markets with 1-month data. In the 
previous section of results, it was pointed out that the statistical relationship between the Fama 
regression variables appears weak. The rolling regression analysis reinforces this perception: 
Indicative of negligible dependence between the variables, predominantly the betas fail to break zero 
at the 95% confidence interval, and the confidence band itself is seemingly large. Moreover, even for 
the currencies that achieved statistical significance in the initial N-W regression, the majority of 
currencies (Mexico, Russia and South Africa) fluctuate on both sides of the zero line and gaining 
significance only momentarily. Thus, not only does the relationship found in the Fama regressions to 
be weak and often biased, based on these rolling models, the statistically significant coefficients are 
materialized from short time periods within the sample. The only consistent currency is the 
Indonesian rupiah for which the beta estimates are invariability negative. Interestingly, the IDR 
market is also by far the least liquid as described in table 2.  
 
Most of the graphs in figure 4 appear to have considerable spike values, potentially indicative of time 
series breaks. Brazilian real and Chilean peso experience sudden and considerable changes in the beta 
parameters around year 2004, while the betas for the remaining currencies predominantly decline 
sharply around year 2008. These are only potentially breaks in the time series, because rolling 
regression is not an exact method of detecting breaks in the mean of the forward premium. There are 
nonetheless some coherence to the existing findings on the time series breaks. Sakoulis, Zivot and 
Choi (2010) locate one of the structural breaks in their study on the 1981-1982 US recession. 
Similarly, there appears to be a structural break in 2008 in the graphs in figure 4, during a recession.  
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Figure 4: Rolling beta coefficient on a monthly interval for a five year window 
Figure 4 shows the time-varying Fama regression results. It reports the beta coefficient fluctuation through time, 
indicating chronological changes in forward bias and non-trivial interpretation of the standard N-W models. These 
equations are run explaining monthly foreign exchange rate changes (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) with one month forward premium, one 
month before the realized spot rate (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡). These are logarithmic quotes. The model is estimated every month for five 
years ahead, resulting in 123 slope coefficient estimates.   
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In summary, the findings from the initial N-W regression as well as from the moving regression 
indicate that a regression model may not be the optimal method to investigate the unbiased forward 
rate hypothesis. The forward premium appears to have a disproportionately low standard deviation 
compared to the standard deviation of the changes in exchange rate to establish a fitting model. The 
steady behaviour of the forward premium appeared to result in a low goodness of fit in the regression 
models, since the coefficient of determination was frequently below 5%. Furthermore, the moving 
regressions indicated that mostly the beta parameters do not remain consistent through time. Instead 
the coefficients are mostly indistinguishable from zero at 95% confidence interval even if the same 
currency had reached statistically significant value in the intrinsic regression. The econometric issues 
in conjunction with the emerging market currency specific exchange rate dynamics lead to the next 
phase of this research; the graphical depiction of the forward bias in exchange rate terms for one and 
five year maturities, followed by a comprehensive discussion of the potential explaining factors. The 
low volatility of the forward premium is turned from a culprit of statistical interference into an 
advantage for the purposes of the distant horizon graphical inspection of the forward prediction error.  
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5.3 Unbiased forward rate hypothesis for one and five year horizons 
The findings above are both interesting and concerning at the same time. It is intriguing to find that 
the uncovered interest rate parity has a completely novel time horizon effect in the emerging 
economies. Unlike has been previously proposed, the forward bias is shown to increase along with 
extending the maturity. The prominent finding from the advanced economies that even though the 
uncovered interest rate parity may not hold well on the short-term, it reinforces along with longer 
maturities, is definitely not materializing in the emerging market currencies. It is however slightly 
troublesome to draw these conclusions because the regression model appeared to fit weakly to 
describe the relationship between the variables, albeit the estimates of bias attained statistical 
significance. The most intuitive reason for the failure of the model fit is the shown low variance of 
the forward premium, both in the literature and in this study. From an econometric point of view it 
simply does not appear plausible that the extremely volatile foreign exchange rate could be explained 
with a forward premium that is known to behave in a highly stable manner (Maynard and Phillips, 
2001; Engel, 1996). Yet, the issue of steady forward premium is advantageous for the following tests.  
 
The final phase of this research is to test the unbiased forward rate hypothesis and time horizon in 
emerging economies with a graphical examination of the forward bias. The forward bias or forecast 
error is defined as the difference between a forward rate and the exchange rate that the forward rate 
intended predict (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖). The prediction error is measured in exchange rate terms with no 
statistical model as such. The unbiased forward rate hypothesis is still tested because the forecast 
error has the same underlying variables as the Fama regression just in a simplified form24. If the 
forecast error is close to zero, the unbiased forward rate hypothesis holds well. If it is positive, the 
forward rate is an upwards biased predictor, and vice versa. A direct analogy to the regression model 
is difficult because a regression examines how the changes in the variables coexist. The measurement 
of bias as forecast error, though, does not take a stand on whether the changes in forward premium 
(which rarely occur) appear simultaneously with the changes in the exchange rate nor does it address 
the question that are the changes in a similar magnitude.  
 
Two hypotheses are set for the expected behaviour of forward forecast error at longer maturities. 
Firstly, in hypothesis 3, it is assumed that, similarly to the hypotheses for the Newey-West regression, 
the forward rate bias disappears at the distant time horizons. Since the data indicated that the emerging 
                                                 
24 The Fama regression (1984) used to take the form (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 (𝑓𝑡
𝑖) + 𝜀𝑡+1), if the unbiasedness holds, then beta 
equals one and alpha equals zero, then (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 ≈ 𝑠𝑡+𝑖). 
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market currencies appear to carry a substantial forward premium at longer maturities, hypothesis 4 is 
comprised substantially differently. Hypothesis 4 assumes that, on the contrary to the UIP to hold 
better at distant horizons, the forward rates are expected to become increasingly biased for longer 
maturities to such extent that the documented bias figure is consistent and one-sided. The rationales 
are as follows: It is presumed that the emerging market exchange rates have been historically on a 
declining trend and, since the premium appears to be sizable, there is a probability and grounds for 
the forward rate to become an upwards biased predictor of future exchange rate (see figure 2). The 
hypothesis is strengthened with the finding of low volatility of the forward premium; if the forward 
rate turns out as an upwards biased predictor, then it is likely for that phenomenon to persist because 
the premium component experiences considerable changes only seldom.   
 
The forward rate maturities employed in the graphical depiction of the forward forecast error are only 
one and five years. The selection of one and five years is slightly arbitrary but the point is to have a 
sufficient time gap to achieve results that are graphically interpretable. Furthermore, the middle years 
(2, 3 and 4) produced similar findings, they are simply more visible in the comparison of one and five 
year maturities. As demonstrated in the methodology chapter, the five year rates are constructed from 
one year forward points. Hence, the five year rate is not an actual five year forward rate, it is a 
synthetic rate in that it is constructed from cumulative 12-month points. As described in methodology 
section in table 5, mathematically the five year forward equals the initial exchange rate and five 
subsequent 12-month forward points.  
 
Next, the findings will be presented in three phases followed by a summary discussion. The results 
for the tests of long-term unbiased forward rate hypothesis are presented in three groups of sample 
countries. The reason is that the forward forecast error is found to behave similarly within each group 
but differently across the groups. The first group consists of Brazil, Czech Republic and Turkey, the 
second of Chile, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa and the third of India, Mexico and South Korea. 
For all the groups, the findings are compared to historical exchange rate graphs presented in appendix 
A, to the average sizes of the forward premiums presented in the data paragraph (table 3) as well as 
to foreign exchange market imperfections and liquidities, also introduced in the data paragraph (table 
1 and 2). Following the three groups of results, a summary subchapter discusses based on the 
preceding contemplations, what appears to account for the findings.  
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5.3.1 Long horizon UIP for Brazil, Czech Republic and Turkey 
First the forward rate prediction error is presented in figure 5 for countries Brazil, Czech Republic 
and Turkey. The interpretation is that the unbiasedness holds at zero (horizontal reference line) and 
the greater the difference, the greater the bias. Analogy to bias estimated in the Fama regression is 
not straightforward given the difference of methods but the point of reference to forward biasedness 
is the literature standard, which is the difference of beta from unity.  
Figure 5: UIP one and five year comparison for Brazil, Czech Republic and Turkey 
Figure 5 depicts the forward rate bias or forecast error defined as (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖) for the countries Brazil, Czech Republic and 
Turkey. In detail, the (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖) measures the difference, in exchange rate terms, between the forward rate for a maturity 
i and the future spot rate that it intended to predict. Thus the spot rate is the rate realizing i time period away from the 
forward contract entry. Maturities i are in this case one and five years. A zero value for the forward prediction error 
implies it has accurately forecasted the spot rate and is thus analogous to the unbiased forward rate hypothesis examined 
in the regression specification previously. In the regression the extent of bias is evaluated with the sign and size of beta. 
From hedging perspective, the size of the forward bias is indicative of either profitable or loss-making forward rate 
maturity depending on which currency the entity is buying and which it is selling with the forward contract (table 7). 
Positive bias implies forwards winding up in loss, if the entity has agreed to sell emerging market currency and buy 
advanced market currency (US dollars).  
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For all these markets, the five year forward rates are consistently biased upwards whereas the one 
year rates are relatively scattered around zero. The five year prediction errors are positive and 
substantially larger than the one year errors throughout the sample. In addition, a common 
characteristic of these three currencies is the trend of reduction of the discrepancy of the five year 
prediction errors towards the end of the sample. The graphically visible increase in the size of the 
forward prediction error when the maturity is lengthened from one to five years is indicative of 
increase in forward bias at distant horizons. The finding in line with the conclusion from the Newey-
West regression results, since the regression also showed an increase of biasedness, measured with 
beta, even though the above currencies did not produce statistically significant estimates. Therefore, 
the figures of prediction error for Brazil, Czech Republic and Turkey are also evidence against the 
finding from advanced economies that uncovered interest rate parity holds better for distant horizons 
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(Lothian and Wu, 2011). Snaith, Coakley and Kellard (2013) suggest UIP to be valid already at three 
years interval in advanced market currencies and a general tendency of decrease in bias, both of which 
are not materializing in the emerging economies based on above graphs.  
 
There appears to be no connection between the FX market profile described in table 1 and the long-
term UIP findings. In comparison of the to the market characteristics of each country, the countries 
above appear relatively well functional in comparison to the rest of the sample. Especially Turkey 
and Czech Republic are examples of unrestricted foreign exchange markets as both have floating 
exchange rates, regular forward markets and the main central bank objective is inflation stability. 
Brazil is slightly different as it has a restricted offshore forward market (NDF) and a central bank that 
does intervene markets, even though the FX regime is defined floating. Hence, based on this evidence 
the reason for the parity failure does not appear to stem from the imperfections in the foreign exchange 
market, because the forward bias is considerable even for these relatively unrestricted currencies.  
 
The historical exchange rates depicted in appendix A and the differences interest rate differentials in 
table 3 help to explain the findings. It appears that the different size of the forward premiums in BRL, 
CZK and TRY has considerable impact to the existence of bias. Interestingly the Czech koruna has 
the sample lowest mean logarithmic annual forward premium (-0.001) and even so, the five year bias 
is notable. The explanation for the high prediction errors for Czech koruna stem from the historical 
exchange rate; it has been declining throughout the sample time line, producing the above figure. On 
the contrary to CZK, the sole reason for the upwards bias in the five year rate for Turkish lira is the 
size of the forward premium. The average forward premium is the sample highest at (0.202) and, 
simultaneously the exchange rate has risen during the entire sample. The lira is actually depreciating25 
heavily during the whole sample time line (from USD/TRY 0.5 to USD/TRY 2.0) and, even so, the 
five year rate is for the majority of the time an upwards biased predictor of future spot rate. Given the 
USD/TRY is increasing in value for the entire time line, the only plausible reason for the positive 
bias in Turkish lira is the disproportionately large forward premium.  
 
  
 
 
                                                 
25 Given currency quotation, depreciation of emerging market currency implies an increase in the value of the exchange 
rate in the historical spot rates depicted in appendix A.   
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5.3.2 Long horizon UIP for Chile, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa 
In figure 6, the distant horizon forward rate bias or forecast error is depicted for Chile, Indonesia, 
Russia and South Africa. For these markets, similarly to the first group, the bias is predominantly 
greater for the five year period compared to one year. In addition, similar is that the five year forward 
bias is consistently positive and the one year bias is relatively scattered around zero. The difference 
between these two is important. As the one year forward biases are distributed around zero, 
occasionally negative and occasionally positive, it implies that the one year rate does sporadically 
predict correctly the future spot rate and, moreover, that the bias is dispersed both upwards and 
downwards. Hence, there is no systematic tendency for the one year forward rate to forecast 
inaccurately the future spot rate as either too large or small. The five year forward rate, however, 
does.     
Figure 6: UIP one and five year comparison for Chile, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa 
Figure 6 depicts the forward rate bias or forecast error defined as (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖) for the countries Chile, Indonesia, Russia 
and South Africa. In detail, the (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖) measures the difference, in exchange rate terms, between the forward rate for 
a maturity i and the future spot rate that it intended to predict. Thus the spot rate is the rate realizing i time period away 
from the forward contract entry. Maturities i are in this case one and five years. A zero value for the forward prediction 
error implies it has accurately forecasted the spot rate and is thus analogous to the unbiased forward rate hypothesis 
examined in the regression specification previously. In the regression the extent of bias is evaluated with the sign and size 
of beta. From hedging perspective, the size of the forward bias is indicative of either profitable or loss-making forward 
rate maturity depending on which currency the entity is buying and which it is selling with the forward contract (table 7). 
Positive bias implies forwards winding up in loss, if the entity has agreed to sell emerging market currency and buy 
advanced market currency (US dollars).  
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Interestingly, as for the previous group, there appears to be a clear connection between the forward 
bias, the historical exchange rate, presented in appendix A and mean forward premium reported in 
table 3. For three of the currencies, Indonesia rupiah, Russian ruble and South African rand, the five 
year forward bias is distinctively positive even though historically the exchange rates have been on 
an overall trend of increment. Consequently, the forward premium has been sufficiently large for 
forward rate to remain an upwards biased predictor. Moreover, as shown in appendix A, the exchange 
rates have experienced even quite volatile upsurges but still the five year forward bias has persisted 
reasonably well. Reinforcing above contemplations, the mean logarithmic 12-month interest 
differentials for the IDR (0.068), RUB (0.051) and ZAR (0.059) are considerable in comparison to 
the rest of the sample. Thus, for these currencies the exchange rates can demonstrate an increasing 
trend accompanied by remarkable upsurges, and still the five year forward rate remains upwards 
biased given the distinct interest rate differential. 
 
Again the foreign exchange market characteristics of the countries do not appear to explain the 
findings above. The Russian and Indonesian foreign exchange markets were concluded in table 1 to 
exercise a rigid monetary policy, whereas the Chilean and South African markets function relatively 
well. Nevertheless, all of them demonstrate a substantial five year forward bias. The Fama regression 
results, however, are well in line with the findings above. In the regressions introduced in table 8, it 
was noted that especially for Chile, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa, the slope coefficients drift 
further away from the null hypothesis of (𝛽 = 1) along with increasing the maturity from one to 
twelve months and they are all statistically significant. In other words, for these countries, also the 
regression models indicated increasingly biased forward rates along with extended time horizon, 
already materializing at the short-term maturities.  
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5.3.3 Long horizon UIP for India, Mexico and South Korea 
The final group consists of India, Mexico and South Korea. Figure 7 plots the forward bias. The 
results from this group are not equally supportive of the finding of escalating bias at distant horizons 
as the preceding groups are. The commonality between these markets is that the five year forward 
rate bias is not as evidently upwards directed and consistent than in the previous findings. For 
Mexican peso the bias does seem to increase from one to five years interval but the discrepancy is 
less unambiguous. For Indian rupee and South Korean won, the five year prediction error is not during 
the sample consistently biased to one direction but instead the forward rate appears to predict 
inaccurately the future exchange rate in both ways.  
Figure 7: UIP one and five year comparison for India, Mexico and South Korea 
Figure 7 depicts the forward rate bias or forecast error defined as (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖) for the countries India, Mexico and South 
Korea. In detail, the (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖) measures the difference, in exchange rate terms, between the forward rate for a maturity 
i and the future spot rate that it intended to predict. Thus the spot rate is the rate realizing i time period away from the 
forward contract entry. Maturities i are in this case one and five years. A zero value for the forward prediction error 
implies it has accurately forecasted the spot rate and is thus analogous to the unbiased forward rate hypothesis examined 
in the regression specification previously. In the regression the extent of bias is evaluated with the sign and size of beta. 
From hedging perspective, the size of the forward bias is indicative of either profitable or loss-making forward rate 
maturity depending on which currency the entity is buying and which it is selling with the forward contract (table 7). 
Positive bias implies forwards winding up in loss, if the entity has agreed to sell emerging market currency and buy 
advanced market currency (US dollars).  
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As figure 7 shows, the final group, India, Mexico and South Korea, have in common a slightly obscure 
impact of time horizon extension. For none of these, based on a graphical inspection, it is equally 
straightforward to conclude that one period dominates the other during the entire sample. Although, 
interestingly the five year forward bias is evidently greater than the one year bias before the year 2008 
after which the results become relatively mixed.  
 
For these currencies the average size of the forward premium is relatively small, appearing to account 
for the inconsistent bias. The mean one year premiums are below sample averages: Indian rupee 
(0.035), Mexican peso (0.038) and Korean won (0.007). In addition, the exchange rates for both rupee 
and peso increase in value, especially sharply after the year 2008, when also the five year bias 
reverses. Thus, even though the relationship between the bias, premium and exchange rate is not 
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accurately modelled, the interpretation in consistent for the final group of results as well. For the 
currencies INR, KRW and MXN the forward premium does not seem to be substantially large enough 
to introduce a visibly consistent upwards bias for the five year forward rate, whereas in the markets 
of Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, it was. Moreover, based on the historical exchange 
rates and the above depicted forward biases for India and Mexico, an appealing explanation is that 
the forward premium is not excessive enough to withhold the volatile exchange rate movements in 
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
For the final group, foreign exchange market liquidity and market imperfections show more 
association to the forward biasedness than for the first two groups. Since the five year forward bias 
is not consistently positive in the final group, it is concluded to represent least biased five year forward 
rates. As described in table 2, the Mexican peso and South Korean won are the two most liquid 
currencies in the sample. In addition, the Mexican peso market was determined among the least 
frictional currencies. The South Korean won and Indian rupee do not fit to this explanation however 
because both of them were defined relatively imperfect. The Indian central bank even exercises a 
managed float exchange rate regime. It appears that the foreign exchange market restrictions have 
surprisingly little impact on the forward rate biasedness results. Market volume and the size of the 
forward premium on the other hand are more suitable explanations to the findings.   
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5.3.4 Discussion of distant horizon forward biasedness 
The preceding subchapters examined the hypotheses 3 and 4 by plotting the forward rate prediction 
error or bias on two maturities, one and five years, on the sample time line. The results were divided 
in three groups based on the found dynamics of the five year bias. The first group was Brazil, Czech 
Republic and Turkey which had in common a considerable increase in forward bias along with 
extending the maturity from one to five years. The five year forward bias was systematically positive 
during the sample while the one year biases were scattered around zero. The second group which 
consisted of Chile, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa, exhibited a similar escalation of forward bias. 
The last group comprised of India, Mexico and South Korea, did produce concurring evidence. 
Instead, the five and one year biases were somewhat identical with no visible systematic tendency of 
increasing prediction error.   
 
Thus for the first two groups, the term effect on the unbiased forward rate hypothesis was concluded 
as reversal to existing evidence, i.e. escalation of bias with longer horizons instead of approaching 
unbiasedness. This leads to the rejection of the hypothesis 3 which stated that forward rate biasedness 
disappears at distant maturities. Such conclusion for the specified countries is argued given the clarity 
of the phenomena: the increase in forward error is consistent through time excluding only a few 
outliers. Hence, for the sake of the argument, there is no need to consider the variance or average of 
the forward biasedness at distant horizon. The current literature propose that the forward premium 
anomaly vanishes along with time horizon for both advanced and emerging economies (See e.g. 
Snaith, Coakley and Kellard, 2013; Lothian and Wu, 2011; Sarmidi and Norlida, 2011). In the 
previous studies, the unbiasedness is found to hold already at three years interval but regardless of 
the exact maturity, the existing studies suggest that the parity theory performs systematically better 
when the time horizon is extended (Snaith, Coakley and Kellard, 2013). There is also academic 
literature proposing that there is no time period sensitivity what so ever, instead a strong currency 
specific, time period indifferent, uncovered interest rate parity (Bekaert, Wei and Yuhang, 2007). 
However, none of the existing papers, to best of my knowledge, have suggested the bias to escalate 
along with extending the maturity. This is the contribution to the mixed line of existing findings; in 
the emerging economies the forward rates become increasingly biased when the time horizon is 
increased.  
 
Mathematically, all of the long maturity UIP failures can be credited to one or both of the following 
two underlying causes: either the exchange rate has indicated a historical trend of decline (appendix 
A) and/or the forward premium has been excessively large for the given period (table 3). The results 
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indicate that the relative size of the forward premium is a determinant factor of the resulting five year 
biasedness. For the currencies that have the highest forward premiums, Brazilian real, Indonesian 
rupiah, Russian ruble, South African rand and Turkish lira, the five year forward bias withholds 
during the entire sample time line, even though the exchange rates experience a substantial increasing 
trend in the aftermath of the year 2008. Concurring with the interpretation, also Indian rupiah and 
Mexican peso experience substantial exchange rate increase after year 2008, but for them the distant 
horizon forward bias disappears henceforth. A compelling explanation is that for Indian rupiah and 
Mexican peso the forward bias disappears because the forward premium is smaller than for BRL, 
IDR, RUB, ZAR and TRY. Mean premium values reported in table 3 reinforce this perception. The 
Czech koruna and Chilean peso also exhibit a consistently positive five year forward bias. The cause, 
however, appears to be assignable to historical trend of the exchange rate. The exchange rates have 
been declining during the majority of the sample and the average forward premiums are low. Making 
interpretations based on the average value of the one year forward premium is argued with frequently 
shown property of the forward premium to follow a highly stable behaviour. Thus the arithmetic 
average value is assumed to be well representative of the sample distribution. The graphs of five year 
forward premium for IDR, KRW, MXN and ZAR presented appendix D support the propositions 
above.   
 
Overall, the market imperfections or frictions described in table 2 appeared to have little if no 
connection to the results. In the data section’s subchapter 4.1.1 the sample countries were divided 
into three categories according to their foreign exchange market restrictions. Russia and Indonesia 
were concluded especially frictional as they e.g. deploy a managed float regime (table 2). In addition, 
Brazil can be considered a relatively frictional market given the non-deliverable market and active 
interventions. All three exhibited substantial increase in forward rate biasedness at the five year 
maturity. However, currencies not entirely favouring this explanation were the Turkish lira and South 
African rand as the exchange rates are freely determined in the markets with no institutional 
intervention. Still, the forward rate bias escalation and time horizon effect were evidently present. 
Thus, even though there would be an endeavour for institutions to alter the way an exchange rate 
evolves, it appears to be the considerable forward premium that takes the blame for biasedness. Even 
in a fully functional market, the forward rate is consistently and substantially at such high levels that 
exchange rate has not achieved to attain it.   
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An important and plausible explanation of the findings in this study is the peso-problems, analogous 
to an issue of having a small sample size for an econometric study with long-run variables. The issue 
of peso problems is defined as low-probability high impact events not occurring in the sample. I 
would argue that the financial instability that began in 2008 should have or would have likely 
triggered any such event, as it is well known that the emerging markets have experienced several 
drastic sell-offs during these times that have led the EM currencies to depreciate. Nevertheless, the 
results are mostly consistent through the instable times as well. The suggested concrete low-
probability triggers include a complete nuclear annihilation by Froot and Thaler (1990) and thus the 
reliability of the sample in this study gathered only from post Bretton Woods era should not be 
excessively questioned. Rather the argument could be targeted for those intending to extend the 
sample period to including the times of fixed exchange rate regimes.  
 
Next the implication of the long-term forward bias to practical hedging of foreign exchange risk is 
analysed followed by concluding remarks. For the OTC foreign exchange market participants, the 
extent forward prediction error as well as the Newey-West regression results are of paramount 
interest. Not only can a multinational company hedging in the OTC markets benefit from the findings 
but in addition, in particular the measure of forward rate prediction error, is of pivotal importance for 
the financial institutions operating as the service providing dealers in the marketplace.   
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5.4 Hedging implications of the findings 
Because the OTC foreign exchange is remarkably liquid market in terms of volume, the uncovered 
interest rate parity or the unbiased forward rate hypothesis does not only arise academic intrigue but 
also the importance of results and implications is remarkable for all the participants in the OTC FX 
market. Especially the measurement of the forward bias in exchange rate terms is relatively directly 
usable for analysing practical implications to both non-financial entities and financial institutions. On 
the other hand, the Fama regression results are of less practical interest, unless the model is highly 
functional. The conventional use of beta coefficient as a measure bias lacks a clear, applicable, 
connection to the practical foreign exchange OTC operations.  
 
For the foreign exchange participants the main take-away from the Fama regression is to discover 
whether or not the model can be used to predict future exchange rate developments. Given the low 
goodness of model fit, the Newey-West regressions are not efficient forecasters of future exchange 
rates. As a measure of bias, as suggested in the literature of international finance, the size of the beta 
coefficient is in fact quite impractical. In the regression, the beta equals the estimated slope of the 
fitted line. The problem is that the premium experiences changes on a relatively small scale. Thus, 
even though the produced beta estimate is negative and significant, it only tells that the increase in 
the forward premium (which is small and infrequent) is associated with a decrease in the change of 
an exchange rate. All of the premium values may well be large and positive and all of the changes in 
exchange rate be negative and still produce a positive beta estimate, provided that an increase in the 
forward premium is associated with a change in exchange rate that is less negative. Then, according 
to literature practices, the forward premium would be concluded less biased than believed, even 
though actually the forward rates would be all the time upwards biased (see appendix G fitted lines 
for intuition). Only when the intercept term equals zero, the usage of beta as an estimate of biasedness 
is to some extent justifiable.  
 
The long-term UIP study was carried out by measuring and depicting the forward rate prediction error 
defined as (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖). In methodology section, in table 6, it was illustrated how the cash flow impact 
of can derived from the prediction error figure; the residual of the figure (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖 = 𝑥), i.e. the 
forward prediction error itself directly can be used as a measure of hedging profitability. The 
theoretical premise is that a return on a forward contract can be defined as the difference between the 
cash flows materializing from a forward contract and the cash flows that would have, alternatively, 
materialized from a similar transaction carried out using the future exchange rate. Effectively, the 
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hedging profit or loss is the comparison between the alternatives of hedging and speculating, where 
hedging is committing to a forward rate and speculating is waiting for the date of event and execute 
the trade in the future state of the foreign exchange rate market using the then real-time exchange 
rate. Whether a positive figure is indicative of profit or loss depends on which currency the entity in 
question is buying and which it is selling with the forward contract (table 7). Positive bias implies 
forwards winding up in loss if the entity has agreed to sell emerging market currency and buy 
advanced market currency (US dollars) and forwards maturing in profit if the entity is buying 
emerging market currency and selling USD. The connection to carry trade studies is that the foreign 
exchange position effect of committing to a forward contract with which is agreed to buy EM currency 
and sell USD is analogous to taking a speculative long position in the EM currency and short position 
in USD. 
 
It is found that for the following, seven out of ten in the sample, emerging market currencies there is 
a consistent positive forward bias at a five year maturity: Brazilian real, Czech koruna, Turkish lira, 
Chilean peso, Indonesian rupiah, Russian ruble and South African rand. Historically, it has been 
consistently profitable to commit to forward rates that sells USD and buys EM currency while it has 
been systematically unprofitable to commit to forward rates that buys USD and sells EM currency. 
In other words, it has practically never been rationale to hedge a five year risk of that requires a 
forward contract of buying USD and selling EM currency. It may appear drastic to recommend to 
leave a foreign exchange risk exposure open and leave the return to be determined by the unknown, 
and highly volatile, future exchange rate. The strength of the implication, however, stems from the 
unanimous nature of the findings; the five year forward rate in these markets is not just on average, 
or for the most of time, upwards biased, it was upwards biased consistently throughout the sample 
time line.  
 
The finding of the persistent upwards bias at five year horizon and consequently unprofitable hedging 
horizon is particularly eminent for the countries, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, Russia and South Africa 
because the reason for bias stems from the unbearably large forward premium. For these currencies 
there is an observable exchange rate increase simultaneously with a substantial interest rate 
differential. Hence, the reason for forward biasedness is not only in the exchange rate, or more 
explicitly in the global trend of emerging markets growth, but instead in the insupportably large 
forward premium that the change in the exchange rate never manages to reach. Appendix D illustrates 
the stable and excessive forward premium, not achieved by the changes in exchange rate. Hence, the 
implication of an unprofitable hedging horizon (or profitable as addressed above) is notable stronger 
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for these countries. Given that for Chile and Czech Republic, the bias was mainly due to the overall 
trend of EM appreciation, a recommendation of not hedging such exposure is in future (out-of-
sample) is not equally feasible because it would be effectively estimating the trend to continue, which 
is highly speculative.  
 
The contemplations above are equally feasible for the comparison of one and five year horizons. For 
the currencies Brazilian real, Czech koruna, Turkish lira, Chilean peso, Indonesian rupiah, Russian 
ruble and South African rand it is found that mostly the five year forward bias is larger than the one 
year bias, and mostly one-sidedly positive. The one year prediction errors are mostly scattered around 
zero, meaning that the one year rates are neither consistently upwards nor downwards biased 
predictors. The five year rates, however, are and therefore the one year horizon clearly dominates the 
comparison when considering alternatives for hedging with a forward that buys USD and sells EM 
currency. An accurate estimation of an optimal hedge horizon would require some kind of utility 
function approach which optimizes utility in a mean-variance framework. In consideration of the 
conclusions in this section, however, both the mean and variance are redundant because the results 
are graphically visible for the entire sample.  
 
The practical implications of the forecast error to the banking operations is a paramount. Similarly as 
for the non-financial counterparties, the definition of forward return is equally feasible. In addition, 
as presented in an interview of an industry expert in appendix F, the same forward prediction error 
figure (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖) is used by banks as a measure of counterparty default loss. The reason is that if the 
counterparty defaults on the payment of an OTC forward (𝑓𝑡
𝑖), the financial institution needs to enter 
the exchange rate market upon the maturity of the forward and make a similar transaction using the 
current market exchange rate (𝑠𝑡+𝑖). Similarly to the definition of the return on a forward, the figure 
(𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖) equals either counterparty default loss or profit. The analysis of course includes the 
estimation of the probability of the counterparty default.  Nevertheless, the prediction error is of great 
interest to financial institutions because unlike multinational companies, they have a greater variety 
of counterparties and therefore a greater interest for the forward bias. Without knowing the exact 
procedures of the financial institutions participating the OTC foreign exchange market, it is difficult 
to analyse the precise interconnectedness between the findings and practices.   
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6 Conclusions 
I studied the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) in the emerging economies, its time horizon 
dependence, and finally the impact of these both on the FX risk management of a multinational 
company that hedges its risk in the OTC forward markets. The uncovered interest rate parity, also 
referred to as the unbiased forward rate hypothesis, examines how well changes in the exchange rates 
are forecasted by the forward premium/discount. Using a sample of monthly observations for the 
years 1999-2014, Fama regressions with Newey-West standard errors are ran for the 1-, 3-, 6- and 
12-month variables and their consistency throughout the sample is confirmed by running rolling 
regressions. Finally, the parity condition is examined on one and five year periods with a graphical 
inspection of the forward bias, an alteration of the regression variables.  
 
The existing literature has found rather mixed results regarding the uncovered interest rate parity and 
the effect of extending the duration. It can be concluded that, in general, the parity does not hold in 
the short-term in the established currency markets while extending the period increases the 
performance of the theory already at an annual level (Engel, 1996; Snaith, Coakley and Kellard, 2013; 
Lothian and Wu, 2011; Chinn 2006). Also there is evidence of time period or sample selection 
conditionality in that the UIP might hold only for certain intervals within a given data set (Lothian 
and Wu, 2011; Baillie and Bollerslev, 2000). The emerging market currencies provide a novel spark 
to this old theory because they have been shown to feature completely different dynamics than the 
traditional exchange rates e.g. in the form of substantial interest rate differentials and the renown 
carry-trade (Backus, Foresi and Telmer, 2001). Counterintuitively, the literature has found less biased 
forward rates in the emerging economies in the short-term (Frankel and Poonwala, 2010) and parity 
strength already at one year horizon (Sarmidi and Norlida, 2011). These preceding studies differ in 
variable construction and sample size, as this paper employs OTC forward rates instead of interest 
rates and has up to six years of more emerging market currency data.   
 
The findings of this study are mostly dissenting with the literature, already with the Newey-West 
regression model at the one month interval. The appropriate analytical process to make an overall 
conclusion about the forward premium anomaly in the emerging economies, is argued and selected 
to be the scrutiny of only statistically significant slope coefficient estimates. The coefficients attaining 
at least a 5% significance level on a monthly interval are Indonesia (-2.0), Mexico (-0.76), Russia 
(1.6) and South Africa (-4.0). The estimated bias in Russian ruble is slightly surprising, as it is not far 
from the desired unity value, indicating some hope to successfully model the exchange rate 
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predictions by adding new variables to the regression such as the price of oil etc. (Rossi, 2013).  The 
rest of the figures fall in the range of average parameter estimates from the advanced economies, i.e. 
in the range of (−0.5 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ −4), based on the existing literature (see e.g. Froot and Thaler, 1990; 
Engel, 1996). Thus it is argued against the prevailing evidence that the uncovered interest rate parity 
does not function better in the emerging economies than in the advanced economies in the short-term. 
The study in disagreement with these findings is the one by Frankel and Poonwala (2010) who argue 
the emerging economies to be less biased on a monthly interval. In fact, the exact estimates are in 
accordance but the disagreement arises from the interpretation of these results. They compute an 
average value of all slope coefficients, even the ones that are not statistically significantly different 
from zero to draw the conclusion of less biased forward rates in the emerging market currencies. This 
thought process is erroneous in my opinion, given the Fama regression’s low goodness of fit (few 
percentages on average). When investigating only the statistically significant slope estimates, the UIP 
is rejected in emerging economies in accordance with the evidence from advanced economies.  
 
Extending the time period from 1-month, to 3- and 6-months and finally to 12-months produces 
mainly increasingly biased beta estimates. The currencies demonstrating escalating bias, defined as 
the growing discrepancy from the desired unity value are Chilean peso, Indonesian rupiah, and South 
African rand. Also Russian ruble becomes more biased at the 6- and 12-month horizons. This finding 
of increasing bias along with time horizon is the main contribution of this paper. It is a completely 
new finding and a point of view to the existing evidence. The current suggestions for time period 
effect are that, along with increased maturity, the forward bias disappears and the beta coefficients 
become non-distinguishable from unity (Snaith, Coakley and Kellard, 2013; Lothian and Wu, 2011; 
Chinn, 2006) or that there is no time period effect at all, instead the uncovered interest rate parity 
depends on the exchange rate in question regardless of the time horizon (Bekaert, Wei and Yuhang, 
2007). None of the preceding studies, however, have proposed increasingly biased forward rates 
along with lengthened intervals.   
 
The econometric properties of the Fama regression variables are known to be troublesome, especially 
from the time series perspective. Already the sample description shows that the forward premium has 
a substantially lower variance than the change in exchange rate. A corresponding finding has been 
pointed out in the literature frequently (Engel, 1996). The problem it creates is that it is unlikely 
already ex-ante to find a good model fit, where the changes in the forward premium would explain 
the changes in the exchange rate. Unsurprisingly, the coefficients of determination for the N-W 
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regression models are low, indicating that only a residual proportion of the variance in the exchange 
rate is explained by the variance in the forward premium. Furthermore, the stationarity of the forward 
premium may cause statistical interference to the regression. As the GL-ADF tests for unit root show, 
some of the forward premiums appear to have a unit root already at a monthly level. The impact on 
result interpretations is not drastic because a thorough investigation of time series properties would 
require a detection of structural breaks (Baillie and Cho, 2014). The ADF tests have actually been 
found to produce biased results in the existence of structural breaks (Sakoulis, Zivot and Choi, 2010). 
The potential time period dependence is to some degree addressed by running rolling N-W 
regressions.  
 
The rolling regressions are carried out with a monthly non-overlapping data using a five year window. 
No substantial time period dependence is proposed to exist, since the produced running beta 
parameter estimates are mostly not different from zero with 95% confidence interval. However, 
interestingly most currencies indicate sharp changes in the slope estimates for estimation windows that 
include the year 2008. Thus, there appears to be a structural break in 2008, which would be in line with 
the study by Sakoulis, Zivot and Choi (2010) who concurringly locate a structural break at the same time 
as there was a recession, namely during 1981-1982 in the US. As to why it is concluded that there only 
appears to be a structural break in 2008 instead of stating that there is, is that the rolling regression is not 
a method that could directly make this kind of statement, unlike the a multiple mean structural break 
models of Bai and Perron (1998 & 2003). Furthermore, the way the running regression is computed 
always five years ahead, disables the accurate locating of the break point. Nevertheless, there appears 
to be a change in the dynamics of the parity relationship in 2008. The potentially altered dynamics, 
as well as the econometric issues and the presumable highly distinctive emerging market currency 
features inspired the next phase of the research; the graphical depiction of the forward bias for one 
and five year horizons.   
 
A challenge with the distant horizon biasedness test is that data for five year forwards is only scarcely 
available for the emerging market currencies. The problem is addressed by constructing synthetic five 
year forward rates using one year forward premiums. The mathematical composition of the synthetic 
five year forward rate equals the sum of exchange rate and five subsequent one year premiums. The 
annual premiums cover the same time period as the actual five year forward rate would have done. 
The synthetic five year rate is not only an efficient proxy of the actual rate but it is also plausible to 
construct in the real foreign exchange OTC market. Moreover, it is a prudent proxy of the five year 
rate because the actual rates often carry an additional premium. Alternatively, the five year forward 
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premium could have been approximated by simply multiplying the one year premium by five. The 
selection between the methods is arbitrary because the forward premium is mostly found to follow a 
long-memory process (Engel, 1996; Maynard and Phillips, 2001), implying that its variance is so low 
that it is irrelevant which method is employed; both produce coinciding results.  
 
The final part of this research is an examination of the forward rate prediction error or bias, defined 
as (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖), for the maturities of one and five years. Effectively, it is analogous to testing the 
unbiased forward rate hypothesis, because the forecast error is constructed from the Fama regression 
variables. The difference is that the econometric requirements for an effective model specification 
may be neglected: E.g. the lack of correlation between the variables and the low variance of the 
interest rate differential do not exert a statistical interference. This type of analysis is only enabled by 
the distinctively large forward premiums in the emerging market currencies in conjunction with 
presumed trend of currency appreciation, since they create the possibility that the forward bias truly 
is sufficiently significant to be visible from a graphical inspection. As demonstrated in the 
introduction, the one year interest rate differential between Brazilian real and the US dollar on annual 
level can easily achieve 15%, leading to the question: How biased will the forward rate become when 
the forward premiums are accumulated to the five year maturity? 
 
The analysis of the forward prediction errors shows that for the majority of currencies the forward 
bias escalates, concurring to the N-W regression results. The forward bias escalates to such high 
extent that five year biases are systematically positive with practically no exceptions throughout the 
entire sample, whereas the one year prediction errors are mostly substantially smaller and distributed 
around the zero prediction error reference line. The positive bias implies that the five year forward 
rate has been an upwards biased predictor of the future exchange rate. The result is difficult to directly 
compare to the regression slope estimates. However, the finding of a five year bias that is not only 
consistently one-sided but also mostly greater than the one year bias in absolute terms, is an 
unambiguous indication of an increase of biasedness together with the extended time horizon. 
Interestingly, the analytical framework of simple depiction of the prediction errors provides an 
opportunity to find out what is the cause of the findings.  
 
The systematically above zero five year prediction error can stem from one or both of the following 
factors: the exchange rate has been on a descending trend and/or the forward premium is in such 
magnitude that the subsequent variation in exchange rate does not matter. The analysis is 
straightforward:  the five year forward biases are simply analysed in conjunction with the historical 
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exchange rates and the mean forward premiums of the sample. As established frequently in this thesis, 
the variance of the premium is insignificant, suggesting that the average value is well indicative of 
the underlying distribution of forward premiums. For some currencies, it is evident that the forward 
premium is so low that the only factor affecting the forward rate biasedness is the difference between 
the two exchange rates with a five year time gap. Hence, the only cause of the parity failure is the 
emerging market currency appreciating trend. For some currencies the forward rates persist to be 
upwards biased predictors, even though the exchange rate would have ascended through the entire 
sample.  
 
The most intriguing findings provided the countries Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and 
Turkey. The currencies for these economies experience at least some degree of exchange rate increase 
and, nonetheless, the five year forward rates demonstrate a systematic upwards bias. As it happens, 
the Turkish lira is depreciating heavily during the entire sample (from USD/TRY 0.5 to USD/TRY 
2.0). Nevertheless, the five year rates are consistently biased upwards given the remarkably large 
forward premium. Reinforcing this perception, also the rest of these countries have substantial mean 
interest rate differentials in comparison to the rest of the sample. The finding of consistent one-sided 
bias is already remarkable as itself because it affects the profitability of these derivatives but the 
additional notion that the phenomena persists even though the exchange rates would increase 
relatively substantially, has great impact on the interpretation of the findings. It addresses the question 
of how biased predictor of future exchange rate does the forward rate become given the emerging 
market specific, extraordinarily high, interest rate differentials. The results show that the forward 
premiums become so sizable at the five year interval that the exchange rate fails to attain its levels 
even at relatively volatile states of emerging market currency depreciation in the aftermath of the 
2008 financial crisis.  
 
The five year forward rate is found to be a consistently upwards biased predictor also for Czech 
koruna and Chilean peso. However dissimilarly, the main explanatory factor appears to be the 
historical changes in exchange rate, given the combination of a continuous exchange rate decline and 
nearly zero average forward premiums. As a consequence, the magnitude of the five year prediction 
errors in CZK and CLP is declining from high to low levels because the exchange rate has been falling 
during the sample. The only currencies that do not present clear evidence on behalf of increasing bias 
along with time horizon are Indian rupee, Mexican peso and South Korean won. They all have 
positive and considerable five year prediction errors before 2008 but then a strong reversal occurs. A 
compelling explanation is that the forward premium is not large enough to cover the exchange rate 
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upsurge starting in 2008, while for the countries Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, 
it is. In line with this reasoning, the mean forward premiums for India, Mexico and South Korea are 
below sample average.  
 
Also the local foreign exchange market restrictions and differences in the foreign exchange market 
volumes are compared to the diverging distant horizon biases. The regulations and market 
imperfections do not appear explain well the differences in the found forward biases. This is slightly 
surprising because for instance, Doukas and Zhang (2013) find that the countries with non-deliverable 
forward markets, which is one of the dimensions studied in this thesis as well, exhibit higher risk-
return profiles for carry trade. There appears to be no relation between the forward biasedness and 
whether the currencies have non-deliverable or regular forward markets. The OTC foreign exchange 
market liquidities, however, appear slightly more powerful indicators of resulting biasedness. The 
most liquid currencies; Mexican peso and South Korean won are concluded to show least evident 
increase of bias at the five year horizon. In addition, Indonesian rupiah is the least liquid currency 
while demonstrating perhaps the most consistent and highly biased forward rates.   
 
The five year prediction error is not only a direct measure of the unbiased forward rate hypothesis, it 
is also arguably an effective way of defining an OTC forward return. The prediction error is equal to 
the profit or loss of a forward contract (hedge) over the alternative of speculation (transaction using 
the future, unknown, exchange rate). The implication of the finding of systematic positive forward 
bias at five year maturity, is that, historically, it has practically never been profitable to hedge a five 
year foreign exchange risk that would have been hedged by committing to a five year forward contract 
with which is agreed to buy advanced market currency (US dollars) and to sell emerging market 
currency. It has been almost without exceptions during the sample better to speculate and leave the 
risk intact until the date of the event and use the then prevailing exchange rate. The outcome is drastic, 
it has been consistently smart to speculate and leave the faith in the hands of the unknown, and highly 
volatile, future exchange rate. The strength of the implication, however, stems from the unanimous 
nature of the findings; the five year forward rate in these markets is not just on average or for the 
most of time upwards biased, it is consistently throughout the sample. Therefore e.g. any mean-
variance optimization is redundant for the sake of the argument.  
 
One distinct limitation of research defines both this thesis and all other studies endeavouring the 
emerging market currencies; the lack of foreign exchange data. The problem created is frequently 
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cited in the literature as peso problems, which means that small samples may fail to experience low 
probability and high impact events that would alter the results substantially. In favour of this research, 
a substantial proportion of the sample consists of observations from the turbulent post-financial crisis 
years starting in 2008. Instead, the argument should be pointed towards those authors intending to 
extend the sample excessively, for instance past the year 1973 when the exchange rates were 
predominantly highly controlled (Lothian, 1986). Nevertheless, only time will tell will the peso 
problems materialize, leading to the emerging markets currencies to depreciate substantially and 
persistently, thus effectively realizing the change in the exchange rate, predicted by the considerable 
forward premium. Until now such culmination has been far from unfolding.  
 
There are several interesting ways of continuing the work of this thesis including the Fama regression 
model specification in general, simulated sample approach, structural breaks and the reason for their 
existence, utility function approach and the impact of horizon extension on carry trade studies. The 
Fama regression appeared in this research and in so many other studies ineffective as indicated by the 
low coefficient of determination. The Fama model could be specified so that it calculates beta 
coefficient as the impact of increase in forward maturity on the change in exchange rate. The current 
method of analyzing the effect of increase in forward premium of one maturity, often equaling one 
month, appears infeasible given the low volatility of the premium. Optimally, the time horizon effect 
would be modelled more accurately as a consequence. The low volatility of the forward premium is 
of paramount interest as well. When does the premium or the interest rate differential change and 
why? Is it due to institutional interventions, sudden changes in market sentiment or perhaps the 
market expectations of future exchange rate developments? The finding of structural breaks in the 
literature in conjunction with the low variance, lead to presume that the forward premium experiences 
changes infrequently but when it changes, it changes drastically. If data on central banks interventions 
in the spot exchange or forward market is somewhere to be found, their chronological relationship to 
the structural breaks could be studied.    
 
The forward prediction error and its implications to hedging as well as speculation are also attractive 
areas of further study. The finding of consistent positive bias in certain markets is analogous to a 
consistently profitable carry trade at a five year horizon, if covered interest rate parity is assumed to 
hold. Therefore it would be intriguing to study further how the profitability of carry trade evolves as 
a function of time horizon, because according to my understanding, the carry trade studies are mostly 
conducted by examining returns on a monthly, short-term, horizon and with a constantly rebalanced 
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portfolio (Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf, 2012; Doukas and Zhang, 2013). The 
extension of horizon and the application of a buy and hold strategy instead of a constant rebalancing 
could enhance the excess returns since the findings in this research suggest that the carry trade is 
systematically profitable on a five year horizon in some countries of the sample. From the hedging 
and foreign exchange risk management perspective, a utility function approach could be employed. 
Taking into consideration the variance in addition to the return could be highly productive, especially 
for the maturities of one through five years. The five year maturity is already concluded optimal or 
suboptimal depending on the underlying FX exposure. Longer maturities are probably redundant to 
include because the conclusion regarding the five year horizon is so strong that it is not sensitive to 
either average or variance.    
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Appendix A: Sample exchange rates 
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Appendix B: Five year forward rates: justification behind the construction  
The table below shows the reasoning behind the construction of five year forward rates. The computation of five year forward rates is shown methods section and below is 
presented the economic rationale. Five year forward is the sum of exchange rate, i.e. USD/BRL, at t=0, and five subsequent annual forward points (1y Premiums). In the 
example calculation, the five year forward rate is comprised of receiving 1 million dollars five years from the initiation and paying Brazilian real according to the pre-agreed 
forward rate (2.8093). The construction of the five year rate according to the following description may appear complex but it is actually a standard procedure in the foreign 
exchange market. The five year forward rate is approximated with five, consequent, one year forward market and four spot market entries. First the 1mUSD is agreed to buy 
against selling Brazilian real with a one year forward (2008, rate: 2.2896). Upon the realization/maturity of the one year forward (2009), the same US dollar amount is sold in 
spot exchange rate (2.0569), to make US dollar cash flow to zero. Next, applying the same spot exchange rate (2.0569), another one year forward rate is committed to in 2009 
that matures on 2010 (2.1674). Thus, the impact of exchange rate during the five year period is removed. This combination of a spot and forward deal that have the same 
underlying exchange rate equals to a foreign exchange swap, which is why it is simpler for industry experts to read the graph below. The same calculation could be made with 
reversal cash flows, implying the construction is also applicable to foreign exchange risk of selling the 1mUSD upon the maturity of the five year forward.  
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
t 0 1 2 3 4 5
USD/BRL 2.1411 2.0569 1.8793 1.7143 1.895 2.3228
1y Premium 1485 1105 1178 1460 1454 1748
1y Forward 2.2896 2.1674 1.9971 1.8603 2.0404 2.4976
 Five year forward 2.8093
USD outflow (USD/BRL) -$1 000 000 -$1 000 000 -$1 000 000 -$1 000 000
USD inflow (1y Forward) $1 000 000 $1 000 000 $1 000 000 $1 000 000 $1 000 000
Net USD cash flow $0 $0 $0 $0 $1 000 000
BRL outflow (USD/BRL) 2 056 900 1 879 300 1 714 300 1 895 000
BRL inflow (1y Forward) -2 289 604 -2 167 390 -1 997 124 -1 860 300 -2 040 350
Net BRL cash flow -232 704 -288 090 -282 824 34 700 -2 040 350
Sum of BRL cash flows -2 809 268
"Synthetic" Five year forward rate 2.8093
Cost in BRL from from the five year forward  -2 809 268(− 𝑓𝑡 5
5 )*1mUSD 
( 𝑓𝑡
1)
 (𝑠𝑡)
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Appendix C: Forward forecast error (bias) for three years maturity     
The graphs below plot the same forward bias (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖) as the results subchapter 5.5 but for three and five year intervals 
to illustrate that the bias increases along with maturity: For the three year maturity, the bias is smaller than for five year 
maturity but is still considerable. The second purpose of this appendix is to argue that given the selected method of 
graphical inspection, it would not be equally suitable to examine the intervals of years 2-4 similarly as the one and five 
years, that were studied in the results chapter. Such inspection would result in highly obscure presentation and discussion.  
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Appendix D: UIP variables depicted for one and five year intervals 
The UIP variables are the spot rate difference between today’s spot value and future exchange rate (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) and the 
forward premium (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡). In the Fama regression (𝑠𝑡+𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) is the dependent variable and (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡) is the explanatory 
variable. The forward bias was defined as 𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖 which is logical already by intuition as it equals the prediction error 
of a forward rate from the spot rate it intended to forecast. The graphs below depict the UIP variables, the spot rate change 
and the premium, for a few of the sample countries to illustrate the uncovered interest rate parity from this point of view 
as well. In addition, it demonstrates the connection between the UIP and the prediction error, why the graphs turn out as 
they do in the results section.  As can be seen below, for the one year interval, the change in spot rate is scattered around 
the forward premium (the change predicted by the forward rate). This applies to all sample currencies, even to the ones 
not presented here. The five year interval changes the dynamics: the spot rate is still far more volatile but now it differs 
between countries whether the forward premium excessive enough for the spot rate to reach it even at its high levels.   
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Appendix E: Forward yields: 1-month against 12-months  
The graphs below plot yields for one and twelve month forwards for all currencies. The yield is defined as (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖). 
The graphs illustrate how the one month rates are scattered around zero while the 12-month rates are as well but with a 
greater volatility. A similar considerable time period effect as with the comparison of one and five year variables is not 
observable. In each graph, the variable that is closely spread around zero is the one-month yield and vice versa.  
BRL  CLP  
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Appendix F: Interview with Metso Corporation foreign exchange risk manager 
Date: 01.11.2014 
Location: Fabianinkatu 9, Helsinki 
Interviewer: Thesis author 
Interviewee: Mikko Vainikka, Director of Treasury Market Operations in Metso Corporation 
 
1. How are the Bloomberg Terminal daily closing mid-prices constructed for both forward and 
spot rates? Is the data reliable in your opinion? 
 
The quotes in Bloomberg are averages of quotes that are reported by banks. The quotes are not actual 
offered rates but in general they follow closely the interbank market where the prices are extremely 
liquid. Furthermore, Bloomberg removes the effect of infeasible quotes that represent extreme values. 
The prices published by Bloomberg are live feed and the number of banks sending their quotes to 
Bloomberg are in most exchange rates in excess of 20 and approximately dozen for the least liquid 
currencies, such as the Indonesian rupiah. In addition, mostly the Bloomberg quotes have a notably 
thin spread. I think the spot rate and forward point data retrieved from the Bloomberg terminal is 
highly reliable and valid.   
 
2. What is the relationship between computing five subsequent one year forward premiums to 
the taking an actual premium of a five year forward rate?  
 
On average, the actual five year premium is higher than the cumulative annual premiums. The OTC 
foreign exchange market has no intermediary and the counterparty for a multinational company is 
always a financial institution instead of a centralized marketplace. The commitments are made 
directly to another counterparty introducing a counterparty default risk. The financial institutions 
defined as reporting dealers offer the quotes in the OTC market and they are required to price the 
counterparty default risk. The additional premium makes the actual five year premium to differ from 
the interest rate differential for five years. It is not, however, necessarily indicative of a failure of the 
covered interest rate parity and, thus by definition, of the presence of an arbitrage opportunity, 
because the bid-ask spread often disables the arbitrage to the direction in the best interest of the 
financial institution offering the rates. 
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3. What is the practical implication of the forward rate prediction error (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖), tested for 
distant horizons in this study, for financial institutions operating in the OTC foreign exchange 
market?  
 
Unlike multinational companies, financial institutions such as banks have a greater variety of 
counterparties and therefore the counterparty default risk is of greater interest. The implication is that 
basically banks measure the amount of credit default loss with the presented figure (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖), 
because if the counterparty defaults on the payment, on the cash flow they have agreed to deliver 
according to the forward contract, the bank needs to enter the exchange rate market and cover this 
change in their position themselves. The exchange rate used to offset the change in the foreign 
exchange risk position upon the default of a customer is the future, then prevailing, exchange rate 
(𝑠𝑡+𝑖). Thus the difference between the pre-agreed forward rate and the future exchange rate is defined 
as the credit loss in the event of default. The actual computations by banks, however, often include 
some sort of sensitivity or scenario analysis to calculate the probability of the event.   
 
4. What is the practical implication of the forward rate prediction error (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖), tested for 
distant horizons in this study, for multinational companies (non-financial counterparties) 
operating in the OTC foreign exchange market?  
 
In the absence of accounting requirements and standards the profit or loss of an OTC foreign exchange 
forward derivative can be defined as it has done in the research as (𝑓𝑡
𝑖 − 𝑠𝑡+𝑖). This the industry 
standard definition of yield. Accounting practices however could somewhat alter the definition of a 
return because the forward contracts are valued for every financial statement against current spot 
market.  
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Appendix G: Newey-West regression alphas and fitted values plotted 
Appendix G reports part of the estimated alpha values, i.e. regression intercept terms, from the Newey-West regression 
model as well as two graphs of fitted values by the model. The alphas never equal to zero with statistical significance 
which would be required for the unbiased forward rate hypothesis to hold. The highlighted alpha values are the ones 
attaining significance. It is notable that these are especially found for the currencies that exhibited increasingly biased 
forward rates along with extended time horizon, when only the betas were considered. The fitted values below show 
infeasibility of running the Fama regression with the standard one month interval: the range of x-axis values appears far 
too thin in comparison to the range of exchange rate values on the y-axis to draw a meaningful fitted line and for a true 
statistical relationship to exist.   
 
 
Alphas 1-Month 12-Month
Brazil 0.003 0.005  -
Chile -0.002  - -0.056 ***
Czech Republic -0.003  - -0.039 **
India 0.000  - -0.019  -
Indonesia 0.016 *** 0.184 ***
Mexico 0.005  - 0.033  -
Russia -0.006 *** 0.010  -
South Africa 0.025 *** 0.319 ***
South Korea -0.001  - 0.002  -
Turkey 0.003  - 0.045  - 
Indonesia 1-month fitted values 
Indonesia 12-month fitted values 
Forward premium IDR 1-m 
Forward premium IDR 12-m 
